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  Simply put, ring-mail armour was made by making lots of small rings of iron and joining them to make a flexible, but rather heavy, form of protection.58 Although there have been isolated finds of mail dating to the fifth century (see above), there is enough to show that it was certainly still being made. Monumental evidence suggests that the mail came in two lengths: either a ‘short’ version covering the shoulders and coming down to around mid thigh, or a ‘long’ version, which reached to the elbow and the knee.

  Scale armour was made by lacing small overlapping plates of metal on to a fabric or leather structure. The result was a form of protection roughly equivalent to that of mail, but without the large amount of flexibility that mail offered. It would appear that the shape of the scale ‘shirts’ took the same form as those of the mail shirts already described.

  It is common for depictions of muscle cuirasses to be represented on large monuments in this period, such as the Column of Arcadius. There are difficulties with accepting depictions of muscle cuirasses on such monuments at face value. The most obvious of these is that the monuments probably owe more to traditional Hellenistic forms of carving rather than representing contemporary models. Many of the items depicted refer back to ancient hoplite practices rather than reflecting what troops of the time actually wore.59 Furthermore, a close analysis of the monuments has shown that some of these representations of muscle cuirasses actually appear to represent scale or mail armour. This would reinforce the theory that such monuments were carved with an eye more to the Hellenistic traditions of the past than to the accurate representation of contemporary armour.60 As a result, it is likely that muscle cuirasses, being tailored to the individual, would be expensive to manufacture and so be used only by those of higher rank, not the average soldier.

  A surprising absence during this period is that of lamellar armour. Made of longer strips of metal wired to a forming-garment of cloth or leather, these long scales ran vertically in the armour, producing a very firm but extremely stiff protection. Attested both before and after the period, it is curious that between c.350 and 425 there is no evidence at all for this armour. The most obvious explanation is that it continued in use but that there is no written, architectural or archaeological evidence for it. However, the lack of evidence is puzzling.

  The common form of shield used by the Romans was a large oval shape, although the depiction of round shields on monuments has led to confusion. There is evidence that the Roman army was being influenced by Germanic shields, and it is possible that the use of round shields was restricted to guardsmen such as the scholae.61

  The Notitia Dignitatum lists many shield patterns and labels them as though they were associated with specific units within the army. Although the accuracy of the Notitia in this regard is open to question, it is interesting to note that according to Ammianus at the Battle of Strasbourg the Germanic tribesmen recognized Roman units by their shield devices.62 Although the patterns allocated by the Notitia may be of dubious accuracy, the theory that units had specific shield designs appears to be correct.

  The use of segmented armour for the arms and legs of heavily armoured horsemen, the catafracti and clibanari, is attested and evidenced in the drawings of armour produced by the fabricae in the Notitia Dignitatum. However, there is no evidence of its use by the infantry, although this should not be ruled out if the occasion arose. The catafracti and clibanari also had armour for their horses. The exact nature that this took is unclear, although evidence from before and after this period suggests that it could be linen, horn, copper alloy or iron scales, or even possibly mail, though the latter would be extremely heavy.

  Finally, it should be noted that greaves for troops’ legs were now extremely uncommon, although again they are depicted both before and after this period, so it is likely that they continued in use.

  THE NAVY

  In modern states the navy is a separate establishment with its own hierarchy of command. In the Roman Empire the navy seems to have been regarded as part of the army. The Notitia Dignitatum has the various fleets being commanded by praefecti, yet in reality whenever they were used in large numbers the fleets were commanded by magistri or similar senior members of the military establishment.

  The Notitia has a number of fleets stationed in the western empire. The ports used include Ravenna, Misenum, Arles, Aquileia, Como and the mouth of the Somme. There would appear to have been two major types of ship in the fleet. For combat the fleets had warships, the standard galleys as used throughout the later period of the empire. For transport and supply, a number of merchant vessels were maintained with each fleet.63 A third type of vessel was also used: specialized transport ships for the carrying of horses. However, the number of vessels in each fleet is usually unknown, although the strengths of some fleets may give an indication of overall numbers. For example, the fleet stationed in Skythia had 125 lusoriae (light boats) and 119 iudicariae and agrarienses (varieties of light boats) built in 7 years.64 As will be seen later, when large fleets are gathered together for a single campaign, a figure is given in the sources for the combined might of the Roman navy.

  There were also small fleets of riverboats based on the Rhine and the Danube to patrol and secure the rivers. As with the main, sea-going fleets, these were classed as being part of the army, and in these cases they were part of the limitanei (riparienses) stationed on the borders.65

  WARFARE

  Although often ignored by historians, there was a fundamental change in the nature of warfare during the later empire: ‘In a period characterized by defensive strategy and low-intensity warfare associated with the ongoing maintenance of imperial security, the dangers of defeat in a large-scale action far outweighed the benefits of victory.’66 It is often overlooked that Theodosius was defeated by the Goths after the Battle of Adrianople. The defeat saw the end of Roman attempts to inflict heavy defeats on their external enemies regardless of the costs. Instead, they resorted to using blockade and siege. It is only when confronting usurpers that Roman commanders still attempted to defeat the enemy in pitched battles.67 This outlook remained prevalent amongst Roman military commanders, being promoted by Maurikios in his famous Strategikon dating to the late-sixth century, although outright victory was still expected by the aristocracy until after the Fall of the West.

  The desire to avoid pitched battles whenever possible and the change to a more low-level form of warfare led many historians to dismiss the late Roman army as inferior to its predecessors. They interpreted the change as being one of quality: whereas the early army was well trained, well led and well equipped, the later army was poorly trained, poorly led and, at least according to Vegetius, poorly equipped.68 Modern historians have reassessed the information available and come to the conclusion that the later army was as well equipped and led as that of the earlier empire. Unfortunately, in some cases the argument has now swung too far. Army efficiency was, to a large extent, based upon location. Warfare was extremely rare in places such as Africa and Egypt, where the main task of the army was policing the local population and repelling low-scale raids from across the frontier. The troops in these places were not equivalent to the armies of the previous centuries. Troops on more warlike frontiers, such as the Danube, the Rhine and the areas facing Persia, were doubtless better trained, better equipped, and more likely to be led by able and experienced officers.

  Yet this does not mean that the armies of these areas reacted to invasion and war in the same way as earlier armies. Advocates of the concept of late-army efficiency sometimes ignore the fact that, however good the army was, army leaders remained constrained by the difficulties of raising and equipping troops. Having the best army in the world is of little value if it is wasted in unnecessary battles and worn out of existence.

  There is another aspect to the late-Roman practice of using blockade and siege more often than battle. The chance of forcing the enemy to surrender without inflicting large losses was a priority. The standard Roman method of dealing with
enemy prisoners of war was to separate them into smaller contingents and then disperse them around the empire. In this way the barbarians could farm territories left vacant by war as well as providing recruits to the army. The enemy commanders would either be separated from their men and, if competent, enrolled in the Roman army, or executed.69

  Yet ironically the employment of barbarian troops could politically weaken the Roman commander. Both the Senate and the regular Roman army were opposed to the mass employment of barbarians. The need to balance the requirements of defence and the political opposition to the employment of large numbers of mercenaries and federates would remain a worry for all magistri until the last decades of the West, when the army was no longer strong enough to mount serious opposition to their use.

  * This section on the arms and armour of the Late Roman Army is virtually the same as that previously included in the book Stilicho: the Vandal Who Saved Rome (Pen and Sword, 2010). Readers with the previous book may wish to skip this section.

  * See also ‘Spears’.

  Chapter 5

  The Barbarians

  THE ‘GERMANIC’ ARMIES OF WESTERN EUROPE1

  Information concerning the Germanic armies of the fifth century is sparse. Although ancient writers have left descriptions, they are based more on topoi (traditional literary themes) and a desire to differentiate between the tribes than they are reality. An example of this is the francisca. This classic Germanic throwing-axe is portrayed in the sources as being used almost exclusively by the Franks. However, archaeology has shown that it was distributed over a very wide area, being employed, for example, by the Alamanni. As a result, it should be remembered that our descriptions of the various Germanic ‘nations’ conform more to ancient historiography and the desire to find a way of differentiating between the tribes than it does to reality. With this observation in mind, it is possible to investigate the German armies.

  Organization

  Later records show that once the Germans had settled down in their own kingdoms they used a decimal system to organize their armies.2 The theory that this is a technique derived from before their settlements is reasonable, but prior to their establishment in the new, large kingdoms, their armies were formed only from whatever forces were available. These are unlikely to have been conveniently numbered, and so specific organization may have been rare. It is more likely that these armies were based upon a very informal adoption of the decimal system, with plenty of leeway allowed to take into account tribal and even village loyalties.

  Most western barbarians were farmers. When called upon to serve in the army the majority would have been equipped only with a spear and shield, and possibly with missile weapons such as the francisca or the javelin.3 One man usually owned the loyalty and the services of a cluster of farms and villages, which were known as cantons.4 The number of men that cantons could raise would vary, but it is estimated that the largest would be able to muster at most 2,000 men, with the average more likely to be around 1,000.5 This would tie in with the later military official, the thusundifath (leader of 1,000).6 However, each leader would have had a small retinue, his comitatus, which served him in military matters.

  Command

  In theory, the leader of each canton would have a political alliance with a more powerful leader who was likely to have dominated several such cantons. In turn, many of these leaders would serve a yet more powerful individual. The outcome is described by Ammianus Marcellinus:

  Now all these warlike and savage tribes were led by Chnodomarius and Serapio, kings higher than all the rest in authority (potestate excelsiores ante alios reges) . . . these were followed by the kings next in power (potestate proximi reges), five in number, by ten princes (regalesque decem), with a long train of nobles (optimatum), and 35,000 troops levied from various nations, partly for pay and partly under agreement to return the service.

  Ammianus Marcellinus, 16.12.23–27

  Ammianus struggled to translate the German terms into Latin, with reges being the only word he felt was suitable. There can be little doubt that the ten ‘princes’ were the leaders of cantons, and that the ‘nobles’ were their comitatus. These ten warlords owed service, or at least some form of loyalty, to the five men ‘next in power’ and these five followed the orders of Chnodomarius and Serapio.

  This system left little room for formal command and control as practised by the Romans, with each commander knowing his place in the line of battle. Although the warlords may have gained experience in inter-tribal or anti-Roman warfare and raids, they would have little practice of fighting in large armies alongside unknown commanders.

  Although this description seems to follow to some degree the feudal system of the Middle Ages, this is not quite true. In fact, there is a distinct lack of tribal structure, as shown by the ability of groups to move from tribe to tribe. The new barbarian social formations that settled in the west ‘were not simply imported from the woods of Germania’: they were ‘new social forms of identification in a complex environment’.7 In other words, ‘kingdoms’ such as those of the Visigoths and Vandals were not simply the mass migration of whole tribes from outside the Roman empire into the empire to settle on new lands: they were a combination of many different tribesmen from a variety of origins deciding, under different stimuli, to serve under one leader.8 A major example of this lack of unity comes from the invasion of Gaul by the Vandals, Alans and Sueves in 406–407. What is commonly overlooked is that one of the tribes, under their king, Goa, immediately abandoned the invasion and took service with Rome. It is clear that any of the warlords from the canton upwards only owed loyalty to their superiors out of common interests or fear. Each canton was its own political unit with its own, individual agenda. In theory, one could change allegiance whenever desired. The Romans had in the past exploited these divisions for their own political purposes and after Adrianople this factor had allowed Theodosius to slowly strip the Goths of men. Theodosius had negotiated with individual cantons and when agreement was reached had moved them away from the Balkans. In this way he continuously weakened the Goths’ ability to fight. Political disunity was one of the major failings of the Germanic peoples at this time.

  Once within the empire the situation changed. The barbarian kingdoms had no administrative institutions of their own and so used Roman administrative institutions. As a result the barbarians immediately adopted urban lifestyles and their main urban centres developed into capitals. For example, the Visigoths had Toulouse, the Ostrogoths had Ravenna, the Franks had Paris, the Burgundians had Geneva and the Sueves had Braga. This resulted in an increased tendency for the Romans to regard the leaders in these cities as kings and helped to give these kings the military power to dominate their kingdoms.9

  Training and Discipline

  As already noted, the Germanic armies were divided into two. The first is the trained and disciplined comitatus of the individual warlords, retained on a permanent basis with plenty of free time in which to practice the art of warfare, although the level of their skills would depend upon the skill and personality of their warlord. However, it is unlikely that they practised warfare on a larger scale, so the Roman legions tended to have the strategic and tactical advantage in large-scale battles.

  The other part of the army was formed of the farmers who made up the bulk of the German population. The majority were equipped with spears and shields, although the better off would be able to afford a sword.10 Thrown weapons such as axes and javelins were relatively common. These men would have had some training, but this would have varied, and its inconsistency would help to explain their reputation for ferocious charges but inability to keep pace with the Romans in a long fight.

  Only the warlords and the comitatus would have had the finances available to buy horses. This would explain two stereotypes of Germanic cavalry. Firstly, their paucity in numbers: modern estimates suggest that a Germanic army would at the most have a third of its forces mounted. More often than not, the proportion would be lower,
probably at around one-fifth.11 The vast majority of the army were farmers relying on subsistence agriculture who could not afford to buy a horse. Secondly, the high quality of German cavalry: Vegetius himself comments that the Romans had progressed in their cavalry arm thanks to the example set by the Goths, Alans and Huns.12 Yet the quote only refers to the tribes in the east, where the cost of horses was lower and more individuals could afford to own one.13 Eastern horses were also of higher quality. Earlier, Caesar sometimes had to supply his German mercenaries with horses, since their own were too small for the task.14 Yet the situation had improved during the intervening centuries, with the Alamanni being renowned as a people ‘who fight wonderfully from horseback’.15 Moreover, some of the tribes that had broken through the frontiers in the early-fifth century, such as the Vandals, the Goths and the Alans, were from the east. As a consequence, the number and quality of their cavalry was almost certainly greater than that of the indigenous Germans. This would help to explain why these tribes had greater success against the western Roman army than did, for example, the Franks or the Alamanni.

  Barbarian society had metalworkers of great skill and finesse and the quality of the goods they produced matched anything that could be made in Rome. However, there were not many such workers, with the result that many items, such as swords, were available in smaller quantities and at a higher price. The majority of Germanic warriors could not afford a sword.

  Still less could they afford protective equipment. It is interesting to note that a slightly later series of Frankish laws assessed a mail shirt as being equivalent in value to two horses or six oxen and a helmet the equivalent of one horse.16 This helps to explain why the Romans forbade the sale of weapons and armour to the Germans and why Germanic tribes were so poorly armed. Unlike the Romans, they simply couldn’t afford the equipment.