Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 11
Equipment
Missiles The majority of missiles used by Germanic troops appear to be of the hand-thrown variety. Although bows were in use, they were not composite bows as used by the Romans, Alans, Sarmatians and Huns. Instead, they were simple bows made from a single piece of wood.17 Archery does not appear to have been an important part of Germanic warfare, and so the evolution of the bow in the west was very slow when compared to the east. Agathias even goes so far as to claim that the Franks did not know how to use the bow.18 Furthermore, unlike the Huns and the Alans, the Germans did not employ the bow as a mass weapon from horseback. Only individuals used the bow when mounted in the west.19 Unfortunately, there is also little conclusive evidence for the carrying of more than one spear by the cavalry. Representations in art show only a single spear, and ancient authors do not mention the use of javelins by German cavalry. As a result, it may be that German cavalry did not practice missile warfare, instead relying on advancing quickly to close combat and using the spear as a thrusting weapon. This is certainly the impression given by Procopius when describing the later warfare as practiced by the Vandals and Goths.20
As with the bow, although there can be little doubt that the sling was known to the northern tribes, there is very little evidence for its use during the period in question. Therefore, although a possibility, whether it was used by troops in battle remains a mystery.
Alongside the variety of ‘javelins’ and their heavier equivalents (see below), the main missile weapon favoured by the Germanic tribes along the Rhine was the francisca, a throwing axe carried by a large number of warriors. The axe was possibly first called the francisca by Isidore of Seville (c.560–636), who claimed that it was given that name by the Spanish because of its extensive use by the Franks.21 It is notable that slightly earlier than this Gregory of Tours (c.538–594) called it either the securis or the bipennis,22 therefore only by the later time of Isidore was it used extensively by the Franks. Prior to this, it was used by many of the Germanic tribes, and examples have been found in Britain, Alamannia and further east.23
One area where the Germans were poorly served was in siege warfare. The tribes of the west did not know how to build artillery or other siege weapons with which to take cities. Instead, they were forced to rely on subterfuge and the betrayal of cities by sympathetic individuals within them.
Combat Weapons The sword used by the Germans was their own version of the spatha, the long, double-edged sword that varied from between 0.7 to 0.9 metres in length.24 Unfortunately, although the German smiths were adept at making these weapons, the results were expensive and so restricted the distribution of swords among the poorer classes of warrior. As a result, the most common weapon was the spear. As was stated in the section on Roman equipment, it is commonly assumed that hand-held, shafted weapons were either used as missiles or retained for use in hand-to-hand combat, whereas in reality there was little difference between spears and javelins.
Many of the spears used by the Germans were similar to those used by the Romans, doubtless through the extensive contacts over the centuries and the employment of German warriors by the Roman army. Items such as the Roman pilum and its derivatives such as the spiculum found their equivalent in the German angon and its equivalents, as excavated in places such as Vimose and Illerup (third century) and Ejsbøl and Nydam (fourth century).25 These items were widespread and not the dominant weapon of a specific group. The angon is found as far apart as Britain and the upper Danube.26
However, as with the Romans, the most common item appears to have been a simple spear, which could be used either underarm or overarm by both the cavalry and infantry, and which was about 2.5 to 3.5 metres in length with a variety of metal heads fixed to the top of the shaft.27 These were the most common weapons used by the Germans, being found in large numbers throughout Germania.
One distinctive item of equipment carried by German warriors was the seax, a ‘short-sword’ or ‘dagger’, depending on the dimensions of the individual weapon.28 This was a single-edged blade of various lengths, and as time passed it gradually became longer and developed into a short sword. However, in this early period it is probably best thought of as a dagger for when the primary weapon, either spear or sword, was lost or rendered unusable. Like the francisca, although later identified with a specific people, in this case the Saxons, in the earlier period it was found throughout barbaricum, not just in Saxony.29
Finally, as with the Roman army, there were a number of other weapons that appear to have been used in limited numbers, according to the personal taste of the warrior. Amongst these are axes, clubs and ‘warhammers’, yet it should be remembered that none of these weapons were common.30
Defensive Equipment Metal helmets were extremely expensive and beyond the means of the vast majority of warriors, being restricted to the wealthier nobles and comitatus. What little evidence there is suggests that they were similar to the spangenhelms and ridge helmets used by the Romans. As a cheaper alternative, Ammianus mentions the use of leather helmets which, whilst imperfect, would no doubt be an improvement on going bareheaded.31
It appears that the few individuals who could afford armour wore either mail or scale styles. As is to be expected, these were extremely expensive: they are rarely found in burials, suggesting that they were considered valuable heirlooms rather than items for deposition.32 Although over time these items slowly became more common, the process was slow. One of the greatest rewards for a German leader would be acceptance as a Roman officer, with access to Roman arsenals for himself and his followers. This was to become an increasingly common demand from Germanic invaders.
The shields used by the German tribes appear to have been mainly round or oval in shape and could be anywhere from around 60 centimetres to 1 metre in height (2–3 feet), probably based on personal preference.33 The traditional hexagonal shape associated with the German cavalry employed within the empire during the first centuries BC and AD was still in use, but to a lesser degree than other styles. Although other styles of shield are depicted on monuments, in general they appear to be variants of the oval or octagonal types and may have been relatively uncommon.
In the mid to late twentieth century and earlier there was a form of shield known as the ‘coffin’ shield, which was traditionally assigned to the Goths. Although this is now firmly fixed, it has proved impossible to find any examples in either the sculptural or archaeological record. It is possible that some of the monumental evidence was interpreted as proof of the existence of these shields but that these examples have since been re-interpreted as stylistic conventions caused by the problem of perspective. As a result, although it is has proved impossible to determine whether these forms actually existed, the likelihood is that they did not.
It is interesting to note that during this period there was a change in the shape of the boss on Germanic shields. The metal boss was used to cover the hole in the shield made by the hand-grip. Before and after the period of the migrations the boss was usually a simple dome shape. During the migration period, although the dome shape persisted, there was a shift to a more pointed shape of boss. Warriors would always have punched with the shield when opportunity arose, but the earlier and later dome shape of the boss implies that the shield retained a more important role as a defensive item. The change in boss shape to a point suggests that the shields were now used in an offensive capacity for punching, indicating that for a short period of time during the migrations Germanic warriors adopted a more aggressive attitude to warfare.
Germans and the Empire
The people of the empire had a standard of living, especially amongst the higher echelons, that was unheard of in Germania. During the previous 400 years there had been many examples of German warriors who had entered the empire and risen to high rank, gaining along the way comparatively fabulous wealth. The empire was ‘a land of opportunity with great ease of living’.34 The availability of goods that they could not otherwise obtain accounts for the large numbe
r of raids and attacks launched against the empire by German cantons.
Many Germanic attacks, such as the invasion of Italy by Alaric in 401 and the invasion of Gaul in 406, took place in winter.35 This was probably due to the fact that the farmers who comprised the bulk of the army had little to do agriculturally at this time of year. Further, the harvest in autumn would supply the attackers with food for the campaign.
The superior lifestyle of the Romans also explains why the Germans were determined to settle within the empire. Their leaders could demand military positions, the pay for which would allow them to live to standards they would be unable to achieve at home. Even the peasant farmers would benefit by the move, since there were large areas of agricultural land within the empire that was of far better quality than that across the Rhine. It is little wonder that as the empire declined German pressure on the frontiers increased.
Strategy and Tactics By the time that Aetius came to power German strategy can be defined as putting pressure on the emperor to allow the Germans to settle on imperial soil and to give the Germanic leaders posts within the Roman military hierarchy that would elevate their prestige amongst their followers, as well as giving them the money with which to maintain – and even expand – their comitatus. The practice of cantons raiding the empire seems to have been in decline. Instead, the peoples along the frontiers, especially the Franks, began their slow, inexorable and permanent infiltration of the imperial borders.
In war, although the individual leaders of Germanic tribes may have been more sophisticated than their predecessors, the fact that the troops remained virtually untrained peasant farmers restricted their abilities. With little training and coordination, German tactics on the battlefield could not become too convoluted, as the troops would easily become confused. As a result, in battle the infantry formed a single line with the cavalry on the flanks. However, the Battle of Strasbourg shows that ambushes were a possibility when an opportunity arose.36
When defeated, many of the western Germans simply fled as best they could, but the eastern Germans, such as the Goths, adopted the wagon laager of the nomadic peoples to the east. This gave them a secure place to which they could retreat. Furthermore, it acted as a military camp and could be used as a fortification if needed, as happened at Adrianople and later in Greece.37
Germanic inability to build siege engines resulted in their being unable to capture cities unless by stealth or treachery. As a result, they had to resort to blockade and threat. When circumstances were favourable, as after the victory at Adrianople, these tactics could work. If the circumstances were unfavourable, such as when cities were strongly defended, the Germans tended to bypass them to reach softer targets such as villas. Their lack of siege ability remained a constant weakness in the arsenal of the German tribes, even after their founding of new kingdoms on Roman soil.
In conclusion, it would appear that there were very few changes in tactics or strategy between the first and the fifth centuries. However, the fact that many individual Germans took service in the Roman army no doubt had the effect of very slowly transforming their organization and outlook. Unfortunately, the nature of any such transformation is not documented by the Romans, who believed that they were facing the same type of foes as their ancestors had faced under Augustus and Marcus Aurelius.
The Huns
The political institutions of the Huns appear to have been similar to those of the western Germans. A group of families owed allegiance to a noble or warlord, who in turn gave service to a superior noble. As with the Germans, this resulted in a fluid society where allegiance could easily change unless loyalty or fear kept lesser nobles in their place. The fragmentary nature of Hunnic society is demonstrated by the large number of Huns who, with their leaders, entered service with the Roman army. In some cases this was doubtless to avoid serving an unpopular leader at home who had established a large powerbase and sought to expand it by dominating those tribes around him.
In warfare, the Huns were renowned for their superior skills at horse archery, the majority of their troops being lightly equipped horse archers. Some of the nobles may have employed helmets and body armour, in which case they most probably used the same styles of equipment as their neighbours. If this is the case, then at least some of their forces may have been equipped with simple spangenhelm helmets and either traditional chain- or scale-mail, or possibly lamellar armour. It is probable that scale mail and lamellar predominated, since both of these styles were easier to make and maintain. They were also lighter and easier to tailor to the needs of mounted troops using a bow.
Hunnic swords would probably have been eastern versions of the spatha design, as used by the eastern Germanic tribes and more especially by the Persians. We have no information on additional equipment such as greaves and vambraces. Since the main role of the Hunnic warrior was as a light horse archer, if these items were used at all it is probable that it would have been amongst the nobles, yet even here they would be rare.
The main weapon of the Huns was the asymmetrical composite bow, the lower limb being shorter than the upper limb. The result is a bow that is easier to fire from horseback, since the lower limb tends to make less contact and be less interfered with by the horse. Extensive research by modern bowyers and archers has established that, although the asymmetrical bow requires much more skill and is much harder to master than the symmetrical bow, the end result is an archer that is far superior to one using the symmetrical bow. The asymmetrical bow excels in really high poundages (the amount of power needed to draw back the string), which gives greater range and power, is faster to fire, and performs far better with a thumb ring. In tests a fair degree of accuracy and power can be achieved even with flightless arrows by an archer trained in the use of the thumb ring.38
The Huns did not have regimented training regimes such as those found in the Roman army. Yet this was not necessary. They relied on manoeuvrability as their main tactic:
When provoked they sometimes fight singly but they enter the battle in tactical formation, while their medley of voices makes a savage noise. And as they are lightly equipped for swift motion, and unexpected in action, they purposely divide suddenly in scattered bands and attack, rushing about in disorder here and there, dealing terrific slaughter; and because of their extraordinary rapidity of movement they cannot be discerned when they break into a rampart or pillage an enemy’s camp.39
The Huns relied on the superior horsemanship gained from many years of riding horses to enable them to manoeuvre so rapidly in front of their enemies. This skill also allowed them to employ one of their favourite battlefield tactics – the ‘feigned flight’. By pretending to rout, the Huns would make the enemy believe that the battle was won, coaxing them into chasing after the retreating Huns. Once the enemy formation was broken the Huns would quickly reverse direction and attack the disordered pursuers, usually with devastating effect.40 The ‘hit and run’ tactics employed during both raids into enemy territory as well as large-scale battles was hard for their enemies to counter because of their relative immobility. The prospective losses in booty and the need to maintain troops to face the Huns means that in reality it was probably cheaper to pay ‘tribute’ to the Huns than oppose them. Furthermore, the lack of permanent settlements may have made the Huns particularly difficult for the Romans to fight, since the usual Roman response to a raid was to lead a counter-attack, which devastated the enemy homelands. It is only later that the Huns under Attila appear to have made semi-permanent homesteads. When this happened, they in turn became vulnerable to strikes against their families.41
There was no single king amongst the Huns. Division was by tribe, with each tribe following its own leaders. Although tribes could easily form temporary alliances against mutual enemies, it should not be thought that all Huns were a single ‘people’ with the same aims and ideals. The Huns appear to have been a large collection of tribes who had slowly moved west in a combination of small groups and large armies. Nor was there the co
ncept of a ‘Hunnic empire’. In fact Hunnic mercenaries may have served Gothic kings against their fellow Huns in the fourth century.42 The modern concept of a single, unified horde is mistaken. The only time when the Huns ever approached unity was under the leadership of Attila, and even this was only temporary as after his death his empire quickly collapsed.
For a long time these warriors would be allied to Aetius and be the basis of his military and political standing. Yet towards the end of his rule they would be turned against him and the most renowned point of Aetius’ career would be a fight against these formidable warriors, led by Attila, their most famous leader.
Chapter 6
Magister Militum per Gallias
THE ARMY OF GAUL
After coming to an agreement with Placidia, Aetius was given control of the field army in Gaul. Unfortunately, the actual condition of the army there is unknown at this late date, and is a matter of some debate. As was noted in the introduction, it is possible to use the Notitia Dignitatum as a basis for analysis, but in reality the Notitia is of uncertain reliability.
There is little other recourse for anyone attempting to reconstruct the nature of the fifth-century army. Consequently, the figures that follow, although highly speculative, at least give an impression of what Aetius expected to lead upon assuming command.
The Notitia lists either fifteen or sixteen Auxilia Palatina units, one Legionis Palatina unit, nine Legiones Comitatenses units, ten Legiones Comitatenses and twelve other units whose status is unclear. This gives a theoretical total of 45,600 men if all units are at full paper strength, or the lower figure of 30,400 if a two-thirds strength is assumed.