Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 18

  438

  When it became clear that the West was unable to hinder these acts, in 438 the Vandals began to spread their activities. They now started to raid the western Mediterranean, focusing their attention on the undefended island of Sicily.81

  The reason for the continued neglect of the Mediterranean was that Aetius was focused upon the war against the Goths. Although the Burgundians had been decimated by the Huns, the Goths continued to fight. It would appear that their anger at their treatment was such that they were willing to continue the war unaided, even though alone they were unable to defeat the armies of the West.

  Returning to Ravenna after the marriage in Constantinople, it is probably in 438 that Aetius made slight alterations amongst the commanders in Gaul. Avitus, who had probably been magister militum per Gallias, was appointed praefectus praetorio Galliarum.82 His removal from a military post may have been a consequence of his failure to defeat the Goths in person during the earlier siege of Narbonne, instead relying upon the arrival of Litorius. On the other hand, the new post was a position for which Avitus was supremely suited. A Gallic senator, his appointment could be used as proof that Gaul and its senators remained central to the concept of imperial unity. Further, his intimate knowledge of Gaul and its resources would ease the burden of supplying the army during the Gothic war.

  Interestingly, the appointment of Avitus as first a general and then a civilian bureaucrat demonstrates that the hypothesis that military and civilian posts were now definitely separate is mistaken. As with the earlier empire, talented individuals would be given whichever post suited their abilities, regardless of whether this meant changing between military and civilian status.

  Avitus was probably replaced as magister militum per Gallias by Litorius, who had clearly demonstrated his military ability during the suppression of the bacaudic revolt and by the raising of the siege of Narbonne.83 However, for the campaign season of 438 Aetius once again personally assumed command of the armies in Gaul. In a great battle he won a significant victory, allegedly slaughtering 8,000 Goths.84 This may be the Battle of Mons Colubrarius referred to by Merobaudes in his panegyric.85 The battle demonstrates that Aetius was not content to arrange traditional, set-piece battles with the Goths:

  All the forces of the Goths . . . had sallied forth with their king to ravage Roman territory . . . At the mountain that the ancients call . . . Snake Mountain [Mons Colubrarius]. . . he surprised – as is his custom – and killed the greatest part of the enemy; once the infantry units, which were very numerous, were routed, he himself followed hard on the scattering cavalry troops and overwhelmed those standing fast with his might, and those fleeing with his eager rapidity. Not long afterwards the king himself was on hand with the remainder of his forces, and, stupefied with sudden horror near the trampled bodies . . . [here the text finishes].

  Merobaudes, Panegyric 1, fragment IIA, 10f

  The claim that Aetius preferred to use surprise ‘as his custom’ rather than pitched battle not only demonstrates his skill as a general, but also implies that he could not risk losing the large number of men that would be engaged in a formal battle. At the same time, he may have been employing traditional Roman military doctrine coupled with Hunnic concepts of ‘hit-and-run’ to ensure success in battle. Although the scale of the victory and the number of losses suffered by the Goths are no doubt exaggerated by Merobaudes – since this is a panegyric – it would appear that Theoderic had experienced a fairly heavy reverse. Yet it was not catastrophic, since he refused to accept defeat and the war continued on into 439.

  In the same year Aetius was to receive a welcome piece of good news. In Spain peace had once again been established between the Sueves and a ‘section of Gallaecians’. Yet in part at least this had been forced on the Sueves by an internal problem. Their king, Hermeric, was extremely ill at this time and after the peace treaty had been agreed he abdicated in favour of his son, Rechila.86 Rechila immediately set the tone for his new reign, crushing the Vandal Andevotus near the River Singilis in Baetica and capturing his treasury.87 The southerly location reinforces the possibility that Andevotus was the leader of the remnants of the Vandals in Spain (see Chapter 7). The aggressive start to his reign also implies that Rechila was seeking to negotiate new treaties that were more advantageous to the Sueves.

  The Codex Theodosianus

  In the East there was a further cause for celebration. In 438, after ten years of compilation, the Codex Theodosianus was finally published.88 A major work of civil law, the Codex was commissioned in 429 by Theodosius and listed all of the laws that had been promulgated since the year 312. A copy was sent to Valentinian in the West and was laid before the Senate in Rome for acceptance. In 439 it was accepted as law by the West, so ensuring the continued legal unity of the whole empire.89 Interestingly, the Code implies that the dominance of Aetius was not yet complete by 439. In the Gesta Senatus Urbis Romae (Minutes of the Senate of the City of Rome), which outlines the procedure in the Senate by which the laws were accepted, there were cries for Faustus, Paulus and Aetius to be made consuls.90 However, the fact that neither Paulus nor Faustus ever gained their hoped-for consulships and that Aetius had to wait a further seven years for his third suggests that Valentinian and Placidia may have still retained a large degree of autonomy at this date, although the extent of this is uncertain.91

  By 438 it was clear that the financial situation in the West was deteriorating. In July of that year Valentinian was forced to accept that some of the outstanding taxes he so desperately needed were never going to arrive due to the financial straits of his subjects. As a consequence he agreed to a remission of delinquent taxes, almost certainly in the hope that this sign of grace would encourage the taxpayers to then keep up with their newly levied taxes.92

  439

  It would appear that political circumstances in Ravenna demanded that Aetius leave the conduct of the Gothic war in the hands of Litorius, not least because Aetius may have needed to be present when Merobaudes delivered his second panegyric.93 He would almost certainly have wanted to be at the ceremony when he was honoured with a statue erected by order of the emperors.94 The evidence suggests that Aetius was the most aggressive, talented and – above all – successful military leader in the West. However, with generals of the calibre of Sigisvult and Litorius, plus the fact that the Goths had just suffered a great defeat, Aetius probably felt that there was no need to remain in Gaul and take command himself. As time passed and Aetius began to feel secure in his position, it is notable that he came to rely more and more on his subordinate generals, such as Litorius and Sigisvult, to do the actual fighting whilst he remained in Italy. From a fixed position it would be easy for him to provide strategic direction: messengers would know where to find him without having to chase a campaigning army and as a result he would have all of the intelligence he needed to be able to make the most appropriate decisions.

  Map 9. The Western Empire c.439

  Sigisvult and Litorius

  Questions have been raised concerning the posts being occupied by Sigisvult and Litorius. Prosper states that in 439 Litorius held a post ‘second only to that of Aetius’.95 Since other evidence suggests that at this date Sigisvult was magister equitum, what Prosper probably means is that Litorius was ‘second’ in Gaul, meaning that he was magister militum per Gallias: the military leader in Gaul would no doubt only have to answer to Aetius for his actions. On the other hand, it has been suggested that he may have actually been given a special temporary command as magister militum of Spain.96

  It is almost certain that Sigisvult was magister equitum, especially since he had been honoured with the consulship in 437. It has been proposed that the promotion of individuals to be magistri militiae was ordered by Placidia in an attempt to undermine Aetius’ position.97 However, Aetius at no point appears to have felt threatened by these appointments, and he certainly did not attempt to defeat them by force, as he had Boniface. Moreover, he did not even change his military tit
les in a way to emphasize that he was superior to the magistri militiae who were being appointed. Instead, it is probably nearer to the mark to interpret these promotions as being based upon the military ability and loyalty of the individuals and to them being appointed on Aetius’ recommendation.98

  The Death of Litorius

  Sigisvult’s activities during the campaign season of 439 are unknown. It is possible that both he and Litorius were involved in attacks upon isolated groups of Goths who had been despatched around Gaul in an attempt to extend Theoderic’s power, and so were not present at the Battle of Mons Colubrarius in 438. Sigisvult appears to have been a more cautious commander than Litorius, and hence has received little notice in the surviving histories and chronicles of the period.

  Litorius, however, was a far more aggressive commander. He appears to have been experiencing great success, pushing the Goths back into the territory allocated to them by the treaty of 418. Unfortunately, his success resulted in him becoming complacent about the ability of his Roman troops, along with their Hun allies, to beat the Goths.

  The Goths, now forced on to the defensive, were retreating into their original territories, pursued by Litorius. Sigisvult may also have been involved, although he may instead have remained in Italy. Litorius decided to end the campaign by fighting one last glorious battle near to the Gothic ‘capital’ of Toulouse.

  After seeking the advice of soothsayers, possibly demonstrating that he was a pagan, Litorius led his army into battle with the Goths. After a long fight, with heavy losses on both sides, Litorius led his Huns – probably meaning his bucellarii – in a personal attack, but the Huns were killed and he himself was captured.99 Shortly afterwards he was put to death.100

  In the emergency conditions that followed, it would appear that the Goth Vetericus was temporarily placed in charge – at least if that is the meaning of Prosper’s very short statement ‘in the same period, Vetericus was considered loyal to our state and renowned for the frequent demonstration of his skill in war’.101 Vetericus stabilized the situation following the potentially disastrous defeat.

  In this emergency, Aetius himself left Ravenna to take control of the Gallic army.102 Fortunately for him, the losses suffered both in this battle and in the previous years of the conflict had weakened the resolve of the Goths. In fact, according to Salvian, ‘The Goths sought peace and we denied it; they sent bishops to make terms and we rejected them; they honoured God even in the person of alien priests and we despised him in our own.’103

  There can be little doubt that Aetius wanted to conclude the war with a significant victory, which would help raise morale in the West as well as deter the Goths from renewing their attempts at expansion. As a result, he personally led a campaign against the Goths. Advancing towards Toulouse, Aetius began the siege of a Gothic military camp near their capital. After a brief pause in which to build siege towers, his men breached the walls of the camp and slaughtered the defenders, who were unable to flee.104

  Shortly after the siege Aetius sent Avitus to the Goths to negotiate.105 The end result was a peace treaty that in many ways appears to have left the situation unchanged from before the war started.106 The treaty was most likely unsatisfactory in some details to both the Goths and the Romans. However, in two areas it was beneficial to the Goths: firstly, the Goths needed time to rest and recover their strength after their defeats, although the Romans also needed the peace in order to deploy the freed troops to other theatres of war. Secondly, although the evidence is inconclusive, it is possible that this treaty was the first in which the two sides treated each other as ‘sovereign entities’, and in which Theoderic was recognized as ‘king’ in return for controlling his subjects.107 The impression is reinforced by the fact that, unlike in the previous decade, Theoderic appears to have observed the terms of this treaty until the death of Valentinian, suggesting that one of his main aims – that of being acknowledged in Rome as king and equal – had been fulfilled.

  Following the peace treaty with the Goths Aetius’ reputation, especially in Gaul, was at its height. The Gallic aristocracy especially appear to have been supporting Aetius and his policies in Gaul.108 After the treaty had been arranged, Aetius returned to Italy.109 It is most likely at this time that he learned three pieces of news. The first was not good: in Spain Rechila, the new king of the Sueves, taking advantage of the long war between the Romans and the Goths in Gaul, had captured Emerita.110 The second also was bad and concerned affairs across the Danube.

  The Huns

  Following the agreements with Aetius in 433 and 435, and no doubt encouraged by having a secure peace agreed with the west, Rua turned his attention to the Eastern Empire. Although details are few and no dates are given, it would appear that at some point after Aetius’ visit in 433 the Huns and the East were at war.111 This seems to have been a success for the Huns. However, Rua now achieved a domination north of the Danube, which was not accepted by some of the subordinate tribes. At some point in the late 430s large numbers of the ‘Amilzuri, Itimari, Tounsoures, Boisci, and other tribes who were living near to the Danube were fleeing to fight on the side of the Romans’.112

  Disturbed by the idea that these men could defy him, Rua sent an embassy to Constantinople threatening to renew the war if the Romans did not return the ‘fugitives’. After a flurry of exchanges, conducted by Eslas for the Huns and Plinthas for the Romans, a meeting was set in the town of Margus. Alongside the Roman and Hun delegates were assembled the ‘kings of the Scythians’, probably the leaders of the tribesmen who were defecting to Rome.113

  The East did not want a war and so in the Treaty of Margus agreed to the terms set by the Huns. At least some of its details are preserved by Priscus: the Romans would no longer accept service from individuals fleeing from Hunnic territories; those who had already crossed to Roman territory were to be returned; Roman prisoners-of-war from the previous conflict who had returned home were to pay eight solidi each to their previous captors; the Romans were not allowed to make alliances with any tribes upon which the Huns were about to wage war; the Huns and the Romans were to be treated equally at ‘safe’ markets; and the treaty was to last as long as the east paid 700 pounds of gold annually to the Huns, whereas previously they had paid only 350 pounds of gold.114

  In order to put the tribute into perspective, it is possible to note the annual income of some Roman families: ‘Many of the Roman households received an income of four thousand pounds [of gold] per year from their properties, not including grain, wine and other produce which, if sold, would have amounted to one third of the income in gold. The income of the households at Rome of the second class was one thousand or fifteen hundred pounds of gold.’115 Although appearing a considerable sum, the subsidy was only half the annual income of a family household ‘of the second class’ in Rome. On the other hand, in 434 the cost of supplying the whole of the city of Constantinople with grain was 611 pounds of gold.116 Although a relatively small amount for the rich, the sum was a vast amount for the poor.

  The treaty was a major coup for the Huns and demonstrated to all of their subjects that even the mighty Roman Empire was not beyond their control. Furthermore, even within the Roman Empire the might of the Huns was now an accepted fact: Aetius, in the West, had been restored to power by the threat of Hunnic intervention whilst the East had been forced to accept a treaty imposed by the Huns.

  The power of the Huns was now such that individuals other than Aetius felt that it would benefit their careers if they could establish strong political ties with them. During the negotiations for the Treaty of Margus, the imperial side had been represented by the ex-general and ex-consul Plinthas, who had employed a variety of devious schemes to ensure that he would be the main envoy and so gain influence with both the Romans and the Huns, possibly in an attempt to emulate Aetius’ position in the west.117

  However, the treaty was not concluded with Rua: early in the proceedings he died, possibly as the result of being hit by a thunderbolt.118 A
lthough the date of Rua’s death is stated by the Gallic Chronicler to be 434, other evidence makes this unlikely.119 The major factor is that during the long war with the Goths between 437 and 439 the West was helped by large numbers of Hunnic allies.120 The fact that these Huns continued to serve Rome implies that the political situation amongst their fellows across the Danube had remained unchanged. Although it is possible that Rua’s successor had continued to supply mercenaries to the West, or that these Huns were simply mercenary bands, this is unlikely.

  The rule of the Huns passed jointly to the sons of Mundiuch, Rua’s brother.121 One of these was called Bleda, and apparently he assumed control of the Hunnic tribes facing the Eastern Empire. The other, and the one who inherited control of the tribes facing the Western Empire, was called Attila.122 Following the signing of the Treaty of Margus, in a display of power Attila and Bleda marched through Scythia and fought the Sorosgi, an otherwise unknown tribe.123 The martial attitude of the new rulers was immediately being displayed, although according to Socrates it may have been tempered by the outbreak of a plague, but this is otherwise unattested.124

  Yet even though the news of the death of Rua, his ally, and the accession of Attila, who was of the next generation and so did not have the same personal ties to Aetius, was bad, it was the third piece of news that would have caused the worst shock to Aetius and the court at Ravenna. Either late in 439 or early in 440 news arrived in Italy that a major disaster had happened: the province of Africa Proconsularis, the source of much of the grain for Italy and especially Rome, had been lost.

  Chapter 9

  The Fall of Africa

  AFRICA