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Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 20


  When news was received in Ravenna that Gaiseric ‘had led forth from the port of Carthage a large fleet’ it was suddenly realized that with their new fleet the Vandals could strike anywhere along the coast, and having troops in the correct place to defend against them would be extremely lucky. As a result, a novel entitled De Reddito Jure Armorum (Restoration of the Right to use Weapons) was issued, countermanding a law of 364 that declared that ‘No person whatever, without Our knowledge and advice, shall be granted the right to employ any weapons whatsoever’:30

  Genseric, the enemy of Our Empire, is reported to have led forth from the port of Carthage a large fleet, whose sudden excursion and fortuitous depredation must be feared by all shores. Although the solicitude of Our Clemency is stationing garrisons throughout various places and the army of the most invincible Emperor Theodosius, Our Father, will soon approach, and although We trust that the Most Excellent Patrician, Our Aetius, will soon be here with a large band and the Most illustrious Master of Soldiers, Sigisvuldus, does not cease to organize guards of soldiers and federated allies for the cities and shores, nevertheless, because it is not sufficiently certain, under summertime opportunities for navigation, to what shore the ships of the enemy can come. We admonish each and all by this edict that, with confidence in Roman strength and the courage with which they ought to defend their own, with their own men against the enemy, if the occasion should so demand, they shall use those arms which they can, but they shall preserve the public discipline and the moderation of free birth unimpaired. Thus shall they guard the provinces and their own fortunes with faithful harmony and with joined shields.

  Nov. Val. 9.1 (24 June, 440)

  The same novel also demonstrates that along with ordering the citizens to arm themselves other measures were being taken for the defence of Italy. Aetius had been recalled from Gaul and was gathering troops prior to marching to the defence of Italy, and the magister militum Sigisvult was deploying those troops stationed in Italy to defend against the impending attack.31 The novel also proves that by June 440 the scale of the emergency was so great that envoys had already been sent to the East and Theodosius II had instantly agreed to send troops. Unfortunately, the fact that the East was under great pressure from the Huns would result in a delay in the arrival of the promised reinforcements.

  In other areas too things were not going as smoothly as Valentinian would have hoped. In particular, Aetius was having difficulty in Gaul. The main cause of this is likely to have been a decision made by Aetius: ‘abandoned country properties of the city of Valence were given over for division to the Alans who were led by Sambida (Sangiban)’, possibly the same Alan ‘king’ known as ‘Sangibanus’ who was to feature later in Aetius’ life.32 The decision may have been the cause of an argument between Aetius and Albinus, who was probably the Praefectus Praetorio Galliarum (Praetorian Prefect of Gaul).33 The mutual hostility only appears to have been soothed and the ‘friendship restored’ by the intervention of Deacon Leo, later to become the Bishop (Pope) of Rome.34 It is possible that the settlement of the Alans was also the cause of the ‘disturbances’ in Gaul that Aetius was forced to pacify before he was able to return to Italy.35 Whatever the nature of these disturbances, by June 440 Aetius was expected to arrive in Italy.

  Earlier, in January, a novel had been issued that abolished all tax exemptions.36 This was doubtless aimed specifically at the aristocracy and was a demonstration that the financial condition of the west was becoming alarming and that the loss of the revenues of Africa was a crippling blow. Equally certain is that opposition to the law will have arisen amongst the aristocracy.

  Aetius did indeed return to Italy in June. Once there a novel was issued, dated 4 June, aimed at halting the abuses of tax collectors by allowing complaints against them to be judged by the Praetorian Prefect, rather than the comites (counts) of the treasuries.37 It would appear that this measure may have been attempting to stop the abuses of imperial tax collectors in Gaul, Aetius’ main power base.38 The measure was proposed by Petronius Maximus, the praefectus praetorio himself. It was opposed by Paterius, a man famous for his influence at court.39 There now began a long struggle between Aetius and opposing factions at court.40 Paterius himself later became Praefectus praetorio Italiae and repealed the law in a novel issued on 27 September 442.41 The most likely cause of opposition to Aetius’ policies was the unhappiness of the Senate with the new novel. This stopped the flow of income to the bureaucratic elite involved with the collection of taxes, who were either members of, or intimately connected to, the Senate.

  GAISERIC

  Gaiseric had become a major threat to the security of the West. Yet this was not the only danger. With a fleet at his disposal, even the court at Constantinople feared attack.42 Although the nature and the dating of the building work on the Sea of Marmara has been questioned, the fact that it could be associated with the Vandal threat by the author of the Chronicon Paschale demonstrates the alarm that was caused in the East by the Vandal seizure of Africa.43

  In the meantime, Gaiseric did not remain idle. Unwilling to allow the West to regain the initiative and determined to put pressure on the government in Ravenna to reach a compromise, he gathered his fleet and set sail for Sicily, laying siege to Panormus, the island’s main naval base.44 Taking the city would not only allow him to force the emperor to accede to his seizure of Carthage: it would also allow Gaiseric to capture yet more ships to add to his fleet.

  At least one group of Vandals crossed the Straits of Messina to raid Bruttium.45 However, Gaiseric’s campaign in the island was to end without permanent gain: in a strange irony one of Aetius’ major enemies gave him, and the West, an unexpected relief from Vandal attacks.

  SEBASTIAN

  In 432, after the death of Boniface, his son-in-law Sebastian had taken the position of magister militum before being driven out upon the return of Aetius. Sebastian had fled to Constantinople, but once established he had allowed his followers to engage in ‘piratical’ activities in the Hellespont and Propontis.46 With his position becoming insecure, Sebastian had finally fled from Constantinople, attempting to take refuge with Theoderic and the Goths in Aquitaine.47 Rebuffed, he had fled to Barcelona, but being declared a public enemy had left and travelled to Africa.48

  When Gaiseric was informed that Sebastian had landed he feared that he was intent on using his father-in-law’s reputation to raise an army and retake Africa. Gaiseric was doubtless aware of the loyalty of Africa to Boniface. Furthermore, by the end of the year Gaiseric must have been aware that Theodosius had promised to send aid to the West, as claimed in the novel already mentioned from June 440.49 The double threat of a Roman commander in Africa and an invasion from Constantinople ensured that Gaiseric returned to Carthage.

  Either late in 440 or early in 441 Gaiseric left Sicily. The actual date is unknown, but a letter from Paschasinus, Bishop of Lilybaeum, to Pope Leo I implies that the date may have been early in 441.50 However, at least some of Gaiseric’s fears were unfounded: Sebastian had actually gone to Gaiseric in the hope of gaining asylum from his Roman enemies.51 This hope was to be mistaken. Fearing his military abilities, a short time after his arrival Gaiseric had him executed.52

  It would have been a great relief to the emperor and Aetius when Gaiseric left Sicily. Yet it was not all good news: the damage caused by the Vandals forced Valentinian to lower the assessment of taxes in Sicily and the surrounding islands to one-seventh of their pre-attack level.53 The novel also notes that Syracuse, Aetna, Lilybaeum, Thermae, Solus and other places were to be treated differently, but unfortunately the text after the word ‘Solus’ has been lost and so their treatment is unknown.

  At some point early in 441 Aetius learned the news that the east was finally sending an army to help in the reconquest of Africa.54 This piece of good news was echoed by a second, more personal one. Either in late 440 or early 441 Pelagia gave birth to a son, Gaudentius.55 Possibly prior to this Aetius also had a daughter, although whether her mot
her was Carpilio’s daughter or Pelagia is unknown. She appears to have been married to Thraustila, who was either a Hun or a Goth who served Aetius, probably as a bucellarius. Thraustila later joined Valentinian’s bodyguard and was to play a major part in events after the death of his father-in-law.56

  Buoyed by the news that he now had two sons and that the east was sending an expedition to help the west, Aetius began to prepare for the upcoming campaign, which would begin when the weather cleared in the spring to allow the eastern fleet to sail the Mediterranean in safety.

  Chapter 10

  The Treaty of 442

  440

  Although the Vandal seizure of Africa remained the focal point of activities throughout 440, other events continued to unfold. One of these was the renewal of hostilities with the Sueves in Spain. The cause of the war is unknown, but Aetius at once resorted to the tried-and-tested tactic of sending Censurius as an envoy to the Sueves. On this occasion the tactic failed: instead of negotiating a peace treaty, Censurius was forced to take refuge in Martylis (Mertola) and endure a siege by the Sueves. Eventually he was forced to surrender under terms and was taken prisoner.1 It would appear that he remained a captive with the Sueves until 448, when he was murdered at Hispalis by a man named Agiulfus.2

  441

  Throughout 441 and into 442 the attention of the Western court remained fixated on events taking place in Africa and Sicily and on the financial measures needed to support the army. In March 441 a series of novels was passed enforcing taxes upon the rich and upon the guilds, who were claiming many exemptions due to the privileges given to them by earlier emperors.3 Yet although the focus was to the south, pressure remained on the remainder of the West. At some point either late in 440 or early in 441 Aetius received news of a major bacaudic rebellion in Tarraconensis. With the Goths in Gaul now at peace, and with the troops from the East expected, Aetius decided to send an expedition to Spain. Accordingly, Astyrius, the father-in-law of Merobaudes, was promoted to the post of comes et magister utriusque militia and sent to Spain to suppress the revolt.4

  The appointment as magister utriusque militiae is attested by two separate sources. The first is Hydatius, where Astyrius is called ‘a general of both services’.5 The second is by an ivory diptych found at Liege:

  Fl(avius) Astrius v(ir) c(larissimus) et inl(ustris) com(es) ex mag(istro) utriusq(ue) mil(itiae) cons(ul) ord(inarius)

  CIL XII 10032.2 = ILS 1300

  The appointment is unusual in that both before and after this date Sigisvult is attested as magister utriusque militiae, implying that he held the post continuously under the supreme command of Aetius. Therefore, either Sigisvult remained in post and Astyrius was appointed to a special, one-off command for the campaign in Spain, or Sigisvult stood down and was replaced for a short period before being reinstated to his former post. If Sigisvult was replaced and reinstated, there then remains the possibility that this happened more than once, but the event is not mentioned by the surviving sources. If this is the case, Aetius may have used the junior post of magister utriusque militiae to reward his loyal followers on a periodic, rotational basis. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that this question will ever be resolved, but it is most likely that Astyrius was given a one-off post to ensure his seniority in Spain, whiles Sigisvult remained as magister, but was occupied with the preparations for the African campaign.

  Map 10. Africa, Spain and the East

  The speed at which the expedition was sent to Spain probably relates to the need of the government for the revenues lost when the ‘rebellion’ in Spain began and the need to reconquer quickly the area in order to help replenish the imperial coffers. In fact, the loss of the African taxes was such that in March 441 a novel issued by Valentinian admitted that imperial reserves were almost gone.6

  Once in Spain Astyrius quickly began a savage campaign in order to destroy the ‘rebels’. According to Hydatius he ‘slaughtered the Bacaudae of Tarraconensis in large number’.7 The savagery of the attack was probably due to the fact that the army was needed elsewhere in Spain. The Sueves were attempting to expand their control yet again. In 439 they had captured Emerita, and at some point in 441, possibly after their old king Hermericus had finally passed away after a four-year illness, their new king Rechila captured Hispalis (Seville) and took control of Baetica and Carthaginiensis.8 Coupled with the loss of Tarraconensis to the bacaudae, it was clear that unless serious steps were taken Spain, like Africa, would slip from imperial control.

  It may seem surprising that with the Sueves expanding their dominions and taking control of both Baetica and Carthaginiensis the focus of Aetius was on the bacaudae of Tarraconensis. Yet strategically this was the most sensible option. Prior to any military campaign against the Sueves the army in Spain would need to ensure a secure base from which to operate. Without this, a campaign that ended in defeat would result in disaster, since the defeated troops would have nowhere to go. Furthermore, the dissidents in Tarraconensis were declaring their separation from the empire. As rebels, once the leaders were caught they would be executed and their belongings confiscated by the emperor. In dire straits financially, any revenue would be welcome. Although the Sueves now had a large area under their immediate control, they did not have the forces to defend these new territories against a concerted imperial attack, as long as the imperial forces had a base from which to operate. As a result, and as was usual in late imperial politics, internal rebellions always took precedence over barbarian invasion.

  The African Expedition

  Unfortunately the sources for the African expedition are few and brief. However, with care it is possible to reconstruct a sequence of events that explain the actions and motives of the people involved. However, it should be noted that this recreation is hypothetical and other interpretations are possible.

  At an unknown date in 441 a large fleet was dispatched from Constantinople, bound for Sicily.9 The equipping and organization of the campaign was allocated, according to Evagrius, to Cyrus, the Praefectus Praetorio Orientis.10 It appears that an otherwise-unknown individual named Pentadius was the man who actually ensured that the army was well equipped once it had arrived.11 Both Prosper and Theophanes give a few details concerning the expedition.

  Theodosius opened hostilities with the Vandals by sending the generals Ariobindus, Ansila, and Germanus with a large fleet. They deferred the business with long delays and proved to be more of a burden to Sicily than a help to Africa.

  Prosper s.a. 441

  Theodosius sent out 1100 cargo ships with a Roman army commanded by the generals Areobindus, Ansilas, Inobindos, Arintheos, and Germanus. Gizerich was struck with fear when this force moored in Italy and he sent an embassy to Theodosius to discuss a treaty.

  Theophanes 5941

  Surprisingly, Aspar, the magister militum who had campaigned in Africa against Gaiseric between 430 and 434, remained behind when it could be expected that he lead the campaign. This was probably due to rising tensions between Constantinople and both the Persians and the Huns, demanding the attention of Theodosius’ most trusted general.12 He may also have manipulated events so that he remained near the capital: the example of Aetius and his predecessors in the West may have provided a model that the generals in the east still had hopes of emulating, however remote.

  Of the generals mentioned, Ariobindus was magister militum, and probably the senior officer as magister militum praesentalis.13 Germanus was almost certainly the magister militum vacans mentioned in the Code of Justinian.14 Since Ansila is included in both lists it is possible that he also was a magister militum, but otherwise he is unknown.15 Inobindos and Arintheos are only mentioned by Theophanes and not by Prosper, implying that they were of lesser rank. Neither is known beyond Theophanes’ reference.16 This list of commanders, along with the number of vessels carrying the troops, suggests that this was a significant military expedition, probably comprising the bulk of the praesental army stationed in Constantinople as well as elements of the fi
eld army of Thrace. The commanders would expect to receive further reinforcements from the West.

  Despite their orders to invade Africa, the expedition reached Sicily and then stopped. Once ashore, according to Prosper, they ‘deferred the business with long delays and proved to be more of a burden to Sicily than a help to Africa’.17 There are at least two likely causes for the delay. The first is the need to co-ordinate the forces of East and West, for example deciding who would lead which units and formations, and most especially who would be in overall charge of the army. In a similar manner, Belisarius, in his campaign against the Vandals almost a century later in 533, took advantage of delays in the sea voyage from Constantinople to Sicily to order his troops and to allocate commands.18

  The second is that it is almost certain that orders to stop the attack swiftly arrived from Constantinople whilst negotiations were entered into with Gaiseric’s envoys. Since the reign of Arcadius the East had preferred to husband its armies, instead using diplomacy and its seemingly endless supplies of money in order to ‘subsidize’ potential attackers. The prospective attack upon Gaiseric had caused Gaiseric to panic and send envoys. Gaiseric had been able to defeat the armies in Africa, but he knew that he could not defeat the combined praesental armies of East and West. At the same time, following their traditional policy, if at all possible the East would prefer to reach a peaceful solution to the problem of Africa.