Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 24
The main difficulty, both for Aetius himself and for Merobaudes’ poem, was the loss of Africa to the Vandals. Even prior to 442 the West had been struggling financially; after 442 the situation had deteriorated to the point where by 444 the West was, effectively, bankrupt.46 The question remained as to what Aetius could do to redress matters.
Britain
The peaceful condition of the empire and the ‘renewal’ of its power under the rule of Aetius may also have caused the Romano-Britons once again to hope for help from the continent. Gildas records that they sent messengers:
To Aetius, now consul for the third time: the groans of the Britons . . . The barbarians drive us to the sea; the sea throws us back on the barbarians: thus two modes of death await us, we are either slain or drowned.
Gildas, Exc. Conq. Brit. 20
Unfortunately, Aetius had no time or troops to spare for the help of Britain, especially as the routes north were insecure due to the bacaudae of Armorica. This last appeal to Rome for help failed, and the result was that the British either gave up hope and surrendered or decided to take up arms and fight for themselves:
In the meantime the discomfited people, wandering in the woods, began to feel the effects of a severe famine, which compelled many of them without delay to yield themselves up to their cruel persecutors, to obtain subsistence: others of them, however, lying hid in mountains, caves and woods, continually sallied out from thence to renew the war. And then it was, for the first time, that they overthrew their enemies, who had for so many years been living in their country.
Gildas, Exc. Conq. Brit. 20
Although this passage is of uncertain dating and its accuracy can be questioned, one thing is clear. At some point in the 440s, and almost certainly either during or after 446, the British finally gave up any hope of help from Rome.47
* It should be noted that the dating of the events described here is extremely insecure. It is possible for this treaty to be dated to any year prior to 446, when it is mentioned by Merobaudes (Pan. 2.1-4). This date has been chosen as it allows other events the time to happen and so fits in best with the proposed chronology.
Chapter 12
The Calm Before the Storm
446
Following the panegyric, Aetius once again set to work. Appointing an individual named Vitus as his fellow magister utriusque militiae, Aetius sent him to Spain with an army comprising regular forces and an allied Gothic contingent, although it is likely that Aetius retained the majority of the praesental army in Italy in case of an attack by the Huns.1 The purpose of the campaign is unclear, but since the main field of operations was Carthaginiensis and Baetica, it is likely that the aim was to restore Roman authority in these areas, as they had been under the control of the Sueves since 441 (see Map 12). This would tie in with the otherwise mysterious raid on Gallaecia by the Vandals in 445 (see Chapter 13). The campaign in 446 could expect to face less opposition, since many Sueves would be retained in Gallaecia to garrison strategic points along the coast. That there was no need to campaign in Tarraconensis implies that Merobaudes’ campaign of 443 must have been a success.2
The strategy appears to have worked. Once in Spain Vitus ‘oppressed the population of Carthaginiensis and Baetica’.3 However, the oppression of the population took too long and Rechila was able to gather his troops to face the Roman attack. Somewhere in Spain the Sueves launched an attack on the Romans. The Goths were routed and Vitus fled with the rest of the army.4 The Sueves re-established their rule over Carthaginiensis and Baetica.5 The strategy adopted in Spain was not working out as expected.
447
Aetius’ actions in the following years are unknown, since the remaining sources tell us little about events in the West between 447 and 450. With Gaul seemingly at peace, and with the Vandals keeping faith with the treaty of 442, it is most likely that any new military campaigns were again directed against the Sueves in Spain, although it is possible that, for the first time in many years, Aetius did not send out forces on military operations.6 However, the extant sources focus on an event that occurred in the East.
On 27 January 447 there was a major earthquake and the part of the walls of Constantinople between the porticus Troadensis (near to the Golden Gate) and the Tetrapylon (near to where the Sahzade Mosque now stands) collapsed.7 Almost certainly connected with the news that the walls had fallen and that Constantinople was vulnerable, and annoyed at the East’s refusal to continue with its subsidies, in 447 Attila sent envoys to Constantinople.8 These demanded the return of all of the fugitives from the Huns who had fled to the empire for safety, as well as the tribute that had not been paid, otherwise Attila claimed that he would be unable to restrain the Huns.9
Map 13. Spain and Gaul 449–450
Analysis of the relevant passage of Priscus reveals the possibility that at this stage Attila had not yet brought all of the Hunnic tribes under his rule and that only the payment of tribute would enable him to restrain those he did not control.10 This is an intriguing possibility, but it is just as likely that this was a piece of political posturing designed to allow Attila to pose still as the friend and ally of the Romans whilst making demands with menaces. The ploy did not work. The advisors to the emperor declared that war should be risked, and as a consequence Attila invaded Thrace.11
The new assault was devastating: ‘New destruction broke out in the east. No less than seventy cities were laid waste by the plundering Huns, for no assistance was brought from the west.’12 Callinicus goes further and claims that over 100 cities were captured.13 The Gallic Chronicler’s criticism that no help was sent to the East is surprising. With a shortage of manpower and barbarians occupying large areas of the West, it would seem impossible that Aetius could spare troops. An explanation of the claim may be that, for the first time in many years, the Roman armies of the West were not deployed on campaign. This would explain why the Chronicler was shocked by the fact that troops in the West remained idle whilst the East was fighting a savage war.
The claim that seventy cities were captured also illustrates the perceived savagery of the attack. The cities of Ratiaria, Athyras and Marcianopolis were amongst them, the latter after the defeat and death of the magister militum Arnegisclus in battle at the River Utus in Dacia Ripensis (see Map 1).14 Attila advanced as far as Thermopylae, but by the time he had travelled that far the walls in Constantinople that had collapsed in the earthquake had been rebuilt under the direction of Flavius Constantinus, the Praetorian Prefect of the East.15
At this point the Huns rapidly withdrew from the Balkans: the Hunnic army had contracted ‘sickness of the bowels’, although fortunately for Attila the majority of the army was unaffected, probably thanks to their swift withdrawal from the affected areas.16 With Thrace devastated, Theodosius sent the patricius and former magister militum per Orientem and consul Anatolius to Attila to negotiate a peace.
448
Over the winter of 447–448 the negotiations continued until a treaty was agreed. The terms were harsh. The arrears in the tribute had to be paid in full, amounting to 6,000 pounds of gold, and the new annual tribute was set at 2,100 pounds of gold.17 But, and ‘most dangerous for the future’, a belt of land ‘five days’ journey wide and extending along the Danube from Pannonia to Novae in Thrace’ was to be vacated by Rome,18 implying that prior to this the Romans had been able to interfere in the workings of Attila’s ‘empire’ even if only to spy on his movements and report them quickly to the emperor.19 The net result was that the Huns now had a free crossing of the Danube without the possibility of interference from the Romans. Thrace was completely at their mercy. For Attila, the war was of even greater importance. In his first major campaign as sole leader of the Huns, he had smashed the Roman armies in Thrace and had forced humiliating terms upon the Eastern Emperor. His position as ‘king’ was assured.
The West
In the West the treaties with the Franks, the Goths and the Vandals were holding. Aetius did not have to concern himsel
f with southern Gaul or Africa. However, in Spain there were still the Sueves and the bacaudae to worry about. Although the existing sources for the period tell us little about imperial campaigns in Spain, they do inform us that Rechila launched an attack upon the ‘furthest reaches’ of Gallaecia.20 He was clearly still intent upon consolidating his sphere of domination. Shortly afterwards he died of natural causes and the rule passed to Rechiarus, his son.21
Although the situation in the West appeared to be stabilizing, it is possible that in 448 there was yet another bacaudic revolt in northern Gaul. The Gallic Chronicler states that ‘Eudoxius, a physician by profession and of perverse, if well-developed, talents, fled to the Huns when implicated in the bacauda that took place at that time’.22 Although otherwise unattested, and of dubious reliability, analysis of other sources shows that it is possible that a revolt took place.
The precise nature of events is insecure, but an entry in Jordanes suggests that at some point after 446 there was indeed a rebellion of the bacaudae in northern Gaul. Jordanes is not always the most accurate of historians, yet his testimony concerning events in 451 lists the peoples allied to Rome. Included in this list are the Armoriciani.23 It is possible that these Armoriciani took part in the rebellion recorded by the Gallic Chronicler and that Eudoxius was the ‘Gallic’ leader of the revolt. Although the revolt of 448 was defeated, between 448 and 451 Aetius finally accepted that specific Roman control of the north of Gaul was now lost.
It is possible that Aetius’ change of heart was due to the nature of these rebels. According to the British historian Gildas, at some date in the 440s the Britons sent an appeal to an individual in Gaul, either Aetius or to a later Magister Militum per Gallias named Aegidius: unfortunately, the name is unclear and so Gildas could be referring to either man.24 If it was addressed to Aetius the claims went unanswered, probably because Aetius did not have enough troops to send aid to the Britons and to face the expected Hunnic attack.25 In order to escape from the Saxons, in the fifth century many Britons fled from Britain to Armorica, augmenting the settlers who had allegedly arrived in the fourth century.26 Indeed, so many eventually crossed the English Channel that the area in which they settled was renamed Brittany (‘Little Britain’).
The British nobles and their followers probably settled in Armorica in the mid to late 440s. Therefore, it is possible to suggest that during the bacaudic rebellion of 448 Aetius came into contact with these fresh settlers, whose manpower had swelled the forces in rebellion. Aetius was forced to accept that these new reinforcements meant that he would be unable to defeat any further rebellions using military force. As a result, he entered into negotiations with the rebels. As part of the agreement the Gallic leader, Eudoxius, and possibly his leading followers, was forced to flee and Aetius confirmed the ascendancy of the incoming British aristocracy. In return, the new British leaders formed a military alliance with Aetius, becoming the Armoriciani of Jordanes. At least part of Aetius’ willingness to accept the ‘British’ settlement may have been due to a feeling of guilt: he had been unable to send the help requested to Britain. The charitable actions of Aetius and Valentinian to the refugees from Africa demonstrate that they were aware of the failings of the empire and would take steps to help those who were suffering as a result. Furthermore, these people had shown clear evidence of a loyalty to Rome by crossing the English Channel to remain part of the empire. By accepting the incomers as allies Aetius ensured that the area would now be peaceful, discharged his moral obligations to the British exiles and released the troops campaigning in the area for other service. He will almost certainly have believed that in time the newcomers would retain their loyalty to the emperor in Italy.
Although pure speculation, this hypothesis does allow the sparse information that survives to be transformed into a logical narrative. It also gives an explanation for how the incomers were able to replace the local leaders, who were now in exile, and establish their own ‘Little Britain’. It should, however, be noted that other chronologies can be constructed.
Whatever the cause and the nature of the inhabitants, the acceptance of the bacaudae as semi-independent was probably a necessity since the continuous wars in Gaul and Spain were keeping the treasury at a dangerously low level.
Sigisvult
One further event took place either in or shortly before 448. Contrary to (modern) expectations, by 448 Sigisvult had been made patricius.27 This has resulted in speculation as to the nature of his appointment and the political motives behind it. Recent debate has questioned whether Sigisvult was even made patricius.28 The argument revolves around the belief that a combination of the two titles of comes et magister utriusque militiae and patricius must result in the bearer being the ‘supreme commander’ in the west. Therefore, if Sigisvult – or indeed Merobaudes before him – was magister militum and patricius, then either Valentinian or Placidia must, at least in theory, have promoted him in opposition to Aetius.
This need not necessarily be the case. The concept that a combination of the two titles could only be borne by one man rests on the cases of two of Aetius’ predecessors, Stilicho and Constantius. Yet in both of these examples the men involved were breaking new political ground with their appointments and no doubt were wary of competition. After fifteen years of undisputed leadership it is not surprising that Aetius finally relented and allowed his loyal and long-serving supporter Sigisvult to achieve the only title that had eluded him. By allowing Sigisvult to be made patricius Aetius both rewarded him for his loyalty and ensured that he received the recognition he deserved. The move also ensured Sigisvult’s continued loyalty.
449–450
In line with Aetius’ policy of rewarding his loyal followers with the highest status he could award, in 449 Astyrius, father of Merobaudes, was made consul in the West, at which point he was probably stationed in Arles. In commemoration, he was given a panegyric by Flavius Nicetus.29
Furthermore, Aetius appointed Firminus, a Gaul, as praefectus praetorio Italiae: for the first time since 430 the prefect was not from one of the powerful Italian senatorial families. This was to be only the second time between the years 426 and 465 that a non-Italian was made prefect.30 The appointment has resulted in solemn debate regarding Aetius’ policies concerning the empire and especially of the internal politics prevalent in Rome.31 Unfortunately, these arguments rely on the fact that the previous non-Italian incumbent, Theodosius, was also an appointee of Aetius.32 This is certainly a mistake, as Theodosius was appointed prior to February 430, when Aetius was only magister militum per Gallias and so unable to make such appointments. There are two more likely options. One is that the appointment of Firminus was simply a political ploy to maintain Aetius’ popularity with the senators of Gaul, rather than a response to Aetius’ political and financial requirements within Italy. The other is that the dire financial problems now facing the empire required an ‘outsider’ to force through legislation attempting to raise taxes and recruits from the senators who usually occupied the post of prefect and so could use their power to block or change any proposals.
In reality, it is more likely that the appointment was a combination of the two. The appointment allowed Aetius to reward the Gallic aristocracy who had long since been amongst his greatest admirers: Aetius ‘was a hero to at least a large section of the Gallic aristocracy’.33 This concept is reinforced by his appointment the following year of Opilio, another Gallic aristocrat, to the post of Prefect of the City of Rome, and his apparent seizure of the financial reins from Valentinian and the Senate.34 Furthermore, Aetius’ reliance on these two men and their combined success is supported by the fact that some time around the year 451 both men were elevated to the patriciate, whilst Firminus remained in the post of prefect until 29 June 452.35
The whole episode implies that prior to 450 there had been political opposition to Aetius that had been powerful enough to retain control of state finances. Yet this was now at an end. A novel issued in March 450 remitted all delinquent
taxes prior to September 447 and then renewed the law of 440 limiting the authority of the comites of the treasury and declared that from this time forward the only tax inspectors allowed must be confirmed by either the praefectus praetorio or by Aetius.36 With Firminus’ support, Aetius began an attempt to break the dominance of the Senate of Rome over financial and military matters: the imperial court may have favoured Italians, who had a tendency to forgive each other their outstanding taxes.37
The West
However, things were again beginning to go wrong in the West. A possible sign that king Theoderic was beginning to resent Aetius’ domination, early in 449, and doubtless after negotiations begun in 448, was his giving his daughter in marriage to Rechiarius, king of the Sueves.38 Although it is possible that this was the daughter mutilated by Gaiseric and Huneric, this is nowhere attested, and it is more likely that she was another, unnamed daughter.
There are most likely two major reasons for the marriage alliance. Firstly, there is Theoderic’s desire to break from Roman control. Despite his attempts to break free, or at least establish himself as a political player at court, Theoderic was still confined to his nascent kingdom. An alliance with the Sueves, who were in a similar position to him, albeit with slightly more freedom, would strengthen his hand when dealing with Roman politicians, especially Aetius. Secondly, Theoderic’s daughter who had been married to Huneric and who had been mutilated had returned home. The fact that this was done after the Vandals had made a treaty with Rome no doubt caused Theoderic to blame the emperor and Aetius, at least in part, for the fate of his daughter. Theoderic will have been unhappy to remain in the same subservient position to people who had caused his family such grief.