Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Read online

  There is yet another possible reason for Attila’s decision to invade Gaul. At an unknown time he had received ‘divine’ evidence of his destiny:

  And though his temper was such that he always had great self-confidence, yet his assurance was increased by finding the sword of Mars, always esteemed sacred among the kings of the Scythians. The historian Priscus says it was discovered under the following circumstances: ‘When a certain shepherd beheld one heifer of his flock limping and could find no cause for this wound, he anxiously followed the trail of blood and at length came to a sword it had unwittingly trampled while nibbling the grass. He dug it up and took it straight to Attila. He rejoiced at this gift and, being ambitious, thought he had been appointed ruler of the whole world, and that through the sword of Mars supremacy in all wars was assured to him.’

  Jordanes Getica 35.183 = Priscus, fragment 11.2

  There is one other factor that may have affected Attila’s decision to attack Gaul rather than either the East or Italy. Although usually ignored, in 448 a leader of the bacaudae in Gaul named Eudoxius had fled to Attila.16 Although his fate is nowhere mentioned, there is a strong possibility that part of Attila’s reason for attacking Gaul was out of the belief, fed by Eudoxius, that the bacaudae in the north would rise up to support him against the empire.

  Attila was now determined to fulfil his destiny and the weaker half of the Roman Empire would be his target. Accordingly, he sent envoys to Italy. The message to Aetius had two parts. The first demanded that Honoria be handed over to Attila, claiming that she had been betrothed to him, and as proof Attila sent the ring she had sent to him. More alarmingly, he also demanded that ‘Valentinian should resign to him half of his empire, since Honoria had received the sovereignty of it from her father and had been deprived of it by her brother’s greed’.17 No doubt also included in the message was a further demand that Silvanus the banker be handed over (see Chapter 14). In the meantime, Attila prepared for war.

  451

  As he gathered his armies ready to travel west, Attila’s diplomatic tactics struck a new note. He now declared that in his new role as co-emperor and ‘guardian of Roman friendship, he would wage (war) only against the Goths’.18 No doubt he claimed that this was only his duty, both as the prospective husband of and co-ruler with Honoria and as honorary magister militum. This would not have been the first time that an army of Huns had destroyed Germanic intruders in the West: in 437 under Rua they had annihilated the Burgundians.

  This was a plausible claim and was doubtless intended to create division and turmoil in the Western court. However, Attila had underestimated Aetius. The court in Italy stood firm and rejected the claim. In part, this was thanks to the fact that Aetius was aware of the other envoys that Attila had sent, and of their missions – probably thanks to a spy network both within Gaul and within the Hunnic court. Aetius may have been receiving information from several sources in Attila’s court, including Orestes, who later had a major role in the West. Furthermore, Aetius may have provided several officials to the Huns, some or all of whom reported to him, and it is possible that his son Carpilio was still a hostage with the Huns at this time and able to inform Aetius of events at the Hunnic court.19

  It is also possible that many of the older Huns, who were contemporaries of Aetius and knew him from his days as a hostage, did not support Attila in his attack on the West. This allowed Aetius to inform the emperor and the Senate that Attila was also attempting to form a ‘barbarian coalition’ of Huns, Franks, Alans and Goths in Gaul.

  Attila’s message to the Franks was quite simple. It was a call to arms for supporters of the older brother of the dead king and an attempt to gain support against the younger brother, the adopted son of Aetius. Since Aetius was already supporting the younger son, there was little Aetius could do except reply in kind, attempting to rally support for his foster-son.

  Attila sent envoys to the Alans under Sambida, leader of those Alans who had been settled in the area of Valence (see Map 14). According to Jordanes, Sambida now considered the possibility of joining Attila, although if so this was no doubt out of fear rather than disloyalty to Aetius.20

  Amid all this frantic political activity it was the Hunnic envoys to the Goths that were the cause of gravest concern to the Romans. In a direct contradiction to the message to Rome, Attila sent a message to Theoderic urging him to break his treaty with the Romans, and remember instead the recent defeats he had suffered at the hands of Aetius.21 Aetius was able to use Attila’s duplicity for his own purposes, sending embassies to Theoderic to request an alliance and informing him of Attila’s claim that he was going to attack the Goths. Unsure of whom to trust and of what Attila’s intentions actually were, Theoderic decided to remain neutral and follow his own policies.22

  The Western Alliance23

  For his part, Aetius began an attempt to build a ‘western alliance’ against the Huns. Apart from the attempts to gain the Goths’ support, Aetius also sent envoys to other peoples in the west, including all of those who had signed treaties to serve as foederati when called upon. Obviously, he could rely on at least a large percentage of the Franks, the supporters of the deceased king’s younger son who was his own adopted son.24 At the same time, he sent messengers to the Sarmatians – an alternative and poetic name for any of the nomadic tribes from the east, but which in this case denotes the Alans of Sambida and Goa. Although under pressure from Attila to join with the forces from the east, Sambida now bowed to Roman pressure and agreed to fight against the Huns.25

  In his bid to join together the military powers of the whole of the west, Aetius also sent messengers to several distinct political western entities.26 One of these was the Armoriciani, the semi-independent natives of Armorica, by this date possibly under ‘British’ leadership.27 Another was the ‘Liticiani’ or ‘Liticians’, of unknown origin but perhaps the remnants of old units of laeti now living on the extreme edges of the empire but still willing to serve the Romans.28 Also included were the ‘Ripari’ (Riparians), Franks from northern Gaul, and the ‘Olibriones’, ‘once Roman soldiers and now the flower of the Allied forces’.29 It has been suggested that the Olibriones were old Roman units of riparienses from northern Gaul, now serving the Franks. By this time these units were probably largely manned by Franks, although the new recruits may have been trained in traditional Roman fighting techniques by the Roman officers and their descendants in command of the units.30 An unexpected addition to the list is the Saxons, which would appear strange given their isolation from events, unless they had established otherwise-unknown enclaves in north Gaul, possibly around the regions of Bologna (Boulogne) and Bessin.31 Jordanes also notes the inclusion of several tribes of ‘Celts’ and ‘Germans’, although these are not individually named. Finally, Aetius managed to convince the Burgundians he had settled in Gaul also to join the alliance.

  However, despite the agreements of all of these people, the main concern for Aetius remained enlisting the aid of the most powerful force in Gaul, the Goths of Theoderic.

  The Invasion of Gaul

  Whilst the diplomatic activity was still ongoing, in early 451 Attila arrived on the Rhine. However, he had not neglected his homeland. At the same time as his main force moved west another group of Huns attacked the Balkans, probably in an attempt to pin down the Eastern forces and prevent co-operation between the two empires.32 This demonstrates that Attila did not trust Marcian to keep to the terms of the treaty. On the Rhine he set his men to building boats using wood from the German forests, before crossing the Rhine and entering Gaul ‘as if he had the right to ask for a wife that was owed to him’.33

  Despite being called a ‘Hun’ army, Attila’s army was actually composed of many different tribes. Sidonius provides a list of those tribes allegedly joining with Attila’s attack, yet it should be remembered that in some cases the poem may be following traditional literary motifs rather than accurately enumerating the tribes involved.34

  The tribes listed includ
e the Geloni from the region of the Volga, the Neuri and Bastarnae from the Ukraine, the Sciri from the region of modern Odessa, the Rugi from Pomerania, the Bructeri from the Weser and the Thuringi from Bavaria.35 Also included is a contingent from those members of the Burgundians who had remained in their original homeland around the Vistula rather than taking up Aetius’ offer of land in Gaul. Finally, those Franks who supported the claim of the deceased king’s elder son appear to have joined Attila en route.

  However, the main allied contingents were provided by the Ostrogoths under their leaders, the brothers Valamir, Thiudimer and Vidimer, and the Gepids under their king, Ardaric. In fact, Valamir and Ardaric were even recognized by Attila himself as being of far higher value than the other kings.36

  The course of the Hunnic attack on Gaul is sparsely attested and open to different interpretations. The main problem is the fact that medieval ecclesiastical chronicles exaggerated the effects of Attila’s attacks. The medieval chronicles include a list of towns that claimed to have been attacked by Attila, yet many of them are now known to have escaped unscathed.37 What follows is a list of the towns noted as being attacked, taken largely from the Acta Sanctorum (Acts of the Saints), a collection of minor hagiographies (biographies of saints), which include in the text stories concerning the behaviour of religious leaders as their towns were attacked by the Huns, plus an analysis of the accuracy of the claims.38 Along with the accounts of Gregory of Tours, Sidonius Apollinaris and Jordanes, amongst others, these help to expand on the course of the war.

  The War

  Attila marched through Germania towards Gaul. The fact that the Alamanni are not mentioned in any of the sources concerning the invasion suggests that they either simply bowed to the inevitable and let him pass unhindered or that the Huns passed to the north of the Alamannic territory.39 The first city that Attila is known to have attacked was Metz, on 7 April – Easter Eve.40 It was quickly taken and sacked.41 Following this early success, Attila ‘ravaged a great number of other cities’.42 The meaning of the term ravaged is open to question. Most authorities assume that the towns were stormed and sacked, but this would have taken time, and the speed of the Hunnic advance suggests that this was not the case. In the context of the war and of the late Roman empire it is more likely that in reality a large proportion of the towns ‘ravaged’ were not themselves attacked: rather, their supporting territories would have been scoured by the Huns for provisions for their large army whilst the inhabitants cowered behind the city walls.43 After this, the areas ravaged would have needed a large amount of time to bring them back to full productivity. However, some of the more strategically important towns, and any towns that were inadequately defended, were no doubt attacked and sacked in the traditional manner.

  Several towns are described in the Acta as being attacked. Reims was captured and sacked, with its bishop (Saint) Nicasius being killed, and Tongres (Tongeren) was also sacked, although its bishop, (Saint) Servatius, escaped to die shortly thereafter.44 According to the Gesta Treverorum (Deeds of the Treveri) Trier was attacked too, an event possibly supported by excavations in the twentieth century.45 Other towns alleged to have been attacked during Attila’s invasion are Strasbourg, Worms, Mainz, Cologne, Cambrai, Arras, Tournai, Therouanne, Cologne, Amiens and Beauvais.

  It is possible that either Strasbourg or Worms were attacked and sacked, as they were on the route towards the centre of Gaul. Yet the claims that Cologne, Tournai, Cambrai, Therouanne and Arras were also sacked would appear to be unlikely. Instead, it is probable that a small picked force was separated from the main army and sent north in an attempt to force the Franks to submit to Attila’s nominee for the Frankish throne. The Frankish king would in return be expected to establish a firm base and recruit troops for the upcoming campaign (see Map 14). As Attila was expecting a military reaction from the Romans, the ‘Frankish’ detachment will have been given orders to move quickly, so it is likely that these towns had their territories ‘ravaged’ by the invading Huns as they marched to rejoin the main force, and in their search for supplies for their large army, rather than being captured and sacked.

  Yet there is another possible explanation for the widespread devastation of northern Gaul. Attila may have moved his army in separate columns, which would also explain how the Huns were able to sack so many towns. The main force may have moved from Metz to Orleans with two or more contingents operating on its flanks. This would have been difficult for the Romans to oppose because there were many threats and Aegidius may not have been strong enough or mobile enough to do more than withdraw ahead of Attila.46

  Map 14. Atilla’s Invasion of Gaul

  This is unlikely. Attila would not have known how the different groups within Gaul were going to respond to his invasion. Nor did he know of their likely deployment. The chances are that, apart from the ‘Frankish’ detachment, he would have wanted to keep his troops concentrated to meet any threat from the Romans. The majority of damage not caused by the main force is probably attributable to either the troops sent to the Franks or to the activities of the Hunnic scouts as they scoured the countryside for supplies and information.

  In addition, thankfully for the future capital of France, Paris was bypassed. Although normally attributed to the intervention of (Saint) Genevieve, in reality at this period the city was small and insignificant. What is more likely is that the city itself was ignored by the Huns – who were intent upon rejoining Attila – rather than being saved by divine intervention: only the surrounding territories were scoured in the search for supplies.47

  One factor emerges from the Huns’ attacks on the cities of Gaul: all of the ‘sacked’ cities were taken quickly before the Huns pressed on to new targets. This can be contrasted to the siege of Aquileia in the following year.48 It is obvious that the towns and cities of Gaul did not have large garrisons, and that the men who had once been expected to defend them had been removed and were now part of the Gallic field army. This may have been according to Aetius’ orders: no doubt he wanted to concentrate as many troops as possible to face the Huns. Conversely, that he needed to withdraw garrisons from the cities implies that Aetius was fast running out of recruits.

  The Roman Response

  There is no evidence for the activities of the Gallic army when Attila invaded Gaul. Although it is possible that some of the troops were ordered to act as garrisons for the threatened cities, the fact that these cities were taken very quickly implies that this is unlikely. Instead, it is probable that the Gallic army was ordered by Aetius to retreat in front of the advancing Huns, heading for either Toulouse to join the Goths or to Arles to join with Aetius when he crossed the Alps into Gaul.

  Whilst the Huns were ravaging the north east of Gaul Aetius crossed the Alps from Italy with ‘a thin, meagre force of auxiliaries without legionaries’ (tenue et rarum sine milite ducens robur in auxiliis).49 It would appear that he had been anticipating a Hunnic attack on Italy after their diplomacy had neutralized the Goths.50 Once across the Alps, Aetius would have been expecting to meet the Gallic field army before joining the Goths and advancing to face the Huns.51 The remainder of his forces were left in Italy, partly to guard the emperor from attack across the Alps, but possibly also to deal with any unrest in Italy: at this moment of crisis the crops in Italy had failed and the region was threatened with the prospect of famine.52 Unexpectedly, he now found that the Goths were waiting on events in their own territory and refusing to join with him against the Huns. He travelled to Arles and pondered his next move.

  In desperation, Aetius made a final attempt to win the support of Theoderic against Attila. Despite the gravity of the situation, and contrary to expectation, he did not travel to Toulouse in person. Instead, Aetius, intent on using the best man for the job, sent Avitus. Avitus was a favourite of king Theoderic I, having first visited the Gothic court in either 425 or 426. After this he had been involved with the education of Theoderic’s son Theoderic. Avitus had also had a military career, serving under Ae
tius in the campaigns of 430, 431 and 436. Following his successful career under Aetius, Avitus was promoted to be magister militum per Gallias in 437, and had helped raise the siege of Narbo by Theoderic. In 439 he had become praefectus praetorio Galliarum, during which tenure in 439 he negotiated the peace treaty with Theoderic. After this, he had retired to his estates.53 With his prolonged activity in Gaul and his personal contacts with Theoderic, Avitus was the ideal man for the task at hand.

  After a brief but intense bout of diplomatic manoeuvring, Avitus succeeded where Aetius had failed. He convinced the Goths that their interests would be best served by an alliance with Rome against the Huns, although it must be acknowledged that the fact that the Huns had instantly begun to ravage Gaul probably had at least some influence on the negotiations.54 Furthermore, it is possible that rumours concerning the possible attempts by Gaiseric to influence Attila to attack had some weight in Theoderic’s judgement: Theoderic would never forgive Gaiseric for what had happened to his daughter.

  Abandoning his policy of self-reliance, Theoderic prepared for war, taking with him his two eldest sons, Theoderic and Thorismund.55 His other sons were left in Toulouse. In the meantime, it is likely that Aetius called for reinforcements from Italy prior to advancing further into Gaul, as it was now clear that the Goths would not attempt to invade Italy. It is probably at this point that news reached Pelagia that Aetius was in great difficulty in Gaul. She now began praying for his safety and the success of the war.56