Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 36
88. Olymp. fr. 34
89. Olymp. fr. 34; Philost. 12.12.
90. Philost. 12.12.
91. Olymp. fr. 40; Philost. 12.12.
92. Date, Soc. 7.22.20; cause, Philost. 12.13.
Chapter 3
1. Greg. Tur. 2.9.
2. Ibid.
3. O’Flynn, Generalissimos of the Western Roman Empire, pp. 74–75.
4. The dating is slightly problematic, but unimportant. Prosper has him as Dux in 422 (s.a. 422), but he is then acknowledged as magister in 423 (s.a. 423). However, Hydatius states that he is magister in 422 (s.a. 422). The confusion in the sources is most likely caused by a similar political confusion following the unexpected death of Constantius III in 421. Cf. Cass. Chron. s.a. 422.
5. Olymp. fr. 22.2; PLRE Vol. 2, Boniface 3, p. 238.
6. Aug. Ep. 189.
7. Prosp. s.a. 422.
8. Ibid.
9. Prosp. s.a. 422; Hyd. s.a. 422; Chron. Gall. 511 no. 571.
10. Aug. Ep. 220.
11. Hyd. s.a. 422: Salv. De gub. Dei, 7.11. The claim in CAH that he was killed appears to be a mistake: CAH, Wood, The Fall of the Western Empire and the End of Roman Britain, p. 519.
12. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 265.
13. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 75.
14. Prosp. s.a. 423.
15. Olymp. fr. 38.
16. Ann. Rav. s.a. 423.
17. Date, Ann. Rav. Col. 2.10–12; Castinus’ involvement, Prosp. s.a. 423; Hyd. s.a. 424. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 379; cf. Soc. 7.23.
18. Ann. Rav. Col. 2.10–12.
19. PLRE Vol. 2, Castinus 2, p. 270. On the theory that Theodosius accepted Castinus’ own proposal of himself as candidate for consul, see O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 75. On the failure of the embassy, see for example, Greg. Tur. 2.8; Soc. 7.23.3 ff.; Philost. 12.13.
20. Philost. 12.13.
21. Cod. Th. 2, 17.3; Aug., Civ. Dei, 18.54.
22. Merob. Pan. 2.110–114.
23. Greg. Tur. 2.8.
24. Greg. Tur. 2.8; cf. Philost. 12.14.
25. Greg. Tur. 2.8.
26. Prisc. Rom. 3; Cass. Var. 1.4.11.
27. ‘Aetius . . . while still a youth, spent three years in the hands of Alaric as a hostage, and then was passed on to the Huns. Later in life he became the son in law of Carpilio, one-time head of the imperial household and then governor of the palace.’ Greg. Tur. 2.8.
28. Prosp. s.a. 424.
29. Ibid.
30. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 101ff.
31. Pseudo-Aug., Ep. 4, PL33, 1095, cited in Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 76–77.
32. Prosp. a.424: ‘John’s defences were weaker because he tried to recapture Africa, over which Boniface was maintaining his control.’
33. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 379; Sirm. 5 (9 July 425); Arian tendencies, Freeman, ‘Aetius and Boniface’, p. 430.
34. Prosp. 424.
35. cf. Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 281.
36. Chron. Min. 1.470.
37. Prosp. s.a. 424.
38. Olymp. fr. 43. The appointment as Caesar was normal, with the appointment as Augustus certain to follow at the appropriate time, yet the manner of the appointment was also doubtless to ensure that Theodosius maintained seniority, rather than Valentinian being seen as an equal.
39. Greg. Tur. 2.8; Olymp. Fr. 46; Marcel. com. s.a. 424.
40. Philost. 12.13.
41. PLRE Vol. 2, Candidianus 3, 257.
42. Soc. 7.18, 20 and 23; Joh. Ant. fr. 195; Theoph. AM 5918
43. ‘with gold’: Greg. Tur. 2.8.
44. For a more detailed account of the Huns, see esp. Chapter 12.
45. Philost. 12.13. Socrates (7.23) claims that Theodosius had taken Salona as soon as Honorius had died. This would seem an odd manner in which to begin the new rule of the west.
46. Philost. 12.13.
47. Ibid.
48. Olymp. fr. 46.
49. CAH. 136.
50. Olymp. fr. 43.2; Blockley, 209 and 220, n. 84.
51. Philost. 12.13.
52. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 380.
53. Soc. 7.23 suggests that the passage was assisted by angels, but a rather more prosaic manner of entry seems preferable. Philostorgius suggests that there was a battle outside the city, but his imprecise claim that ‘there was some sort of battle’ (12.13) may be a way of describing the confusion surrounding Aspar’s unexpected entry into the city.
54. Proc. 3.3.9; Philost 12.13.
55. Philostorgius following Olympiodorus claims ‘as many as 60,000’; Olymp. fr. 43.2; Philostorgius 12.14. Also, Cass. Chron. s.a. 425.
56. Greg. Tur. 2.8.
57. ‘Heavy slaughter on both sides’: Olymp. fr. 43.2.
58. Philost, 12.14; Greg. Tur. 2.8; Prosp. s.a. 425.
59. Philost. 12.14 (Olymp. fr. 43.2). On ceding of Pannonia, see Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, p. 89.
60. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 74.
61. Soc. 24.
62. Hyd. s.a. 425; PLRE Vol. 2, Fl. Constantius Felix 14, 461. O’Flynn follows Prosper in dating the patricianship to 429 (Prosp. s.a. 429).
63. Chron. Min. 1. 471.
64. It is possible that either luck or his political and marital contacts helped Castinus to survive at this time, although without evidence it has been decided that the main reason was his decision to maintain a low profile.
65. Cod. Th. 6.2.25 (26 April 426).
66. It is possible that Aetius simply retained the title of comes, but the level and the duration of his activity suggest the more senior post of magister militum, although there is no record elsewhere of the name of any magister militum per Gallias between 411 and 429: O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp. 78 and 82 and 176, n. 35.
67. Chron. Gall 452. s.a. 425.
68. PLRE Vol. 2, Boniface 3, pp. 238–239.
Chapter 4
1. For a more detailed examination of many aspects of the late Roman army, see Sabin, van Wees and Whitby (eds), The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare.
2. For a more detailed examination of the Notitia, and of the changes in the army from the reign of Diocletian, see e.g. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare, Vol 2, p. 271ff.’
3. Hoffmann, D, ‘Der Oberbefehl des spätrömischen Heeres im 4. Jahrhundert n. Chr.’ in DM Pippidi (ed.), Actes des IXe Congrès International d’études sur les frontières romains (Cologne, 1974), pp. 381–397, as referenced in Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops, p. 54, n. 8.
4. For examples, see Appendix.
5. Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, p. 57.
6. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, The Cambridge History, p. 270.
7. For a more detailed discussion of the Roman army hierarchy, see Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe AD 350–425, pp. 89–107.
8. Ibid., p. 99.
9. Ibid., p. 95.
10. Not. Dig. Oc VII.
11. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, 284–602, Appendix III.
12. For the earlier losses, see Hughes, Stilicho, passim.
13. Jones, Later Roman Empire, Appendix III; Jones, The Decline of the Ancient World, p. 81; Heather, Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 175.
14. Jones, The Later Roman Empire, p. 1434.
15. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, pp. 91–92.
16. Rouche, ‘Autopsy of the West’, p. 26. The ‘Ripuarian’ Franks, possibly derived from ripa (‘river bank’), were from the west bank of the Rhine; the ‘Salian’ Franks, possibly from sal (‘salt’, ‘sea-side’, although other derivations are possible) were from Toxandria (north Belgium).
17. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History, p. 281.
18. Hughes, Stilicho.
19. Cod Th. 7.13.16 (406).
20. For a full discussion on the size of units and the problems of dating any changes, see for example Coello, Unit Sizes in the Late Roman Army, passim; Nicasie, Twilight of Empi
re, p. 23ff.; Southern and Dixon, The Late Roman Army, pp. 29–33; Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 89ff; Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History, p. 278ff.
21. By the fifth century these were sometimes known as the obsequium: Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History, p. 278.
22. On milliary units, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 89ff.
23. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History, 271.
24. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 90. As an earlier example, in Alexandria Caesar’s Legio VI had fewer than 1,000 men left of its original ‘paper’ strength of approximately 5,000 men (Caesar, Alexandrian War, 69), and in the Civil Wars his legions average fewer than 3,000 men (Caesar, Civil Wars, 3.6 and 3.89).
25. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 129.
26. Liebeschuetz, Barbarians and Bishops, p. 20.
27. See Southern and Dixon, Late Roman Army, p. 69.
28. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 129.
29. Jones, Decline of the Ancient World, p. 82.
30. Cod. Th. 15.1.13.
31. Zos. 4.23.2-4.
32. For example, the troops that were led by Scipio Africanus in the third century BC were first trained to meet his demanding standards before being led on campaign.
33. For examples, see Amm. Marc. 27.2.2–8, 22.7.7
34. Gildas, De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae, 2.18.
35. For a full discussion, Coulston, ‘Later Roman Armour, 3rd–6th Centuries AD’.
36. Milner (tr.), Vegetius, p. 19, n. 6.
37. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome, p. 208; Amm. Marc. 16.10.8, 19.8.8, 24.6.9, 25.1.16 etc.
38. MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome, pp. 185 and 274, n. 15.
39. Veg. 2.15 and 4.21.
40. Veg. 4.22.
41. No examples of the plumbatae tribolatae have been found, so the weapon must still remain a possibility rather than a certainty.
42. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 108.
43. Veg. 2.15.
44. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 205.
45. Veg. 2.15.
46. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 108.
47. Ibid.
48. Amm. Marc. 19.6.7; Proc. 2.21.7.
49. Theoph. Hist. 8.4.13.
50. Lasso, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 108.
51. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, pp. 213–214.
52. Ibid., p. 213.
53. Attaching of crests, ibid., p. 214.
54. Earlier claims, e.g. James, 1986, cited in ibid., p. 230, n. 43.
55. I would like to thank the members of www.romanarmytalk.com for their in-depth discussions on these topics: for example at www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/viewtopic.php?f=17&t=25150&p=224574&hilit=spangenhelm#p224574 (December 2008–July 2009).
56. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 110ff.
57. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 216.
58. For more detailed analysis of mail manufacture, see ibid., pp. 241–242 and associated bibliography.
59. Coulston, ‘Later Roman Armour, 3rd–6th Centuries AD’, p. 143.
60. For example, Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 208.
61. Germanic influence, ibid., p. 217; guardsmen using round shields, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 115.
62. Amm. Marc., 16.12.6
63. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 97.
64. Elton in Sabin, van Wees and Whitby, Cambridge History, p. 278ff.; Cod. Th. 7.17.1.
65. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 100.
66. Rance, ‘Battle’, p. 343.
67. For example, the Battle of the Frigidus (394) and the invasion of Italy by the east in order to place Valentinian I upon the throne in 425.
68. Vegetius, Epitome of Military Science, 1.20.
69. For example, in 393–394 Stilicho conducted a campaign against Alaric in the Balkans, finally blockading him into surrender. Alaric was forced to serve in the army that Theodosius led at the Battle of the Frigidus in 394. On the other hand, when the Gothic king Radagaisus led his troops into Italy in 405–406 he was blockaded and defeated in the hills near to Faesulae, after which he was executed and Stilicho enrolled 12,000 of Radagaisus’ men into the Roman army.
Chapter 5
1. This includes the armies of the (Visi)Goths, the Franks, the Alamanni, the Burgundians and the Vandals, amongst others.
2. For example, the Goths: Wolfram, History of the Goths, p. 145.
3. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 22.
4. Ibid., p. 72.
5. Ibid.
6. Proc. 3.5.18.
7. Pohl, ‘Ethnicity, Theory and Tradition’.
8. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 41.
9. Ibid., p. 43.
10. From the third century on, the deposition of swords becomes slightly more common in burials, although the finds at Ejsbøl North in Jutland has spearmen outnumbering swordsmen by a factor of three-to-one: Todd, The Early Germans, pp. 41–42.
11. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 58.
12. Veg. 1.20.
13. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 58.
14. Todd, Early Germans, p. 35.
15. Aur. Vic. Caes. 21.2.
16. Todd, Early Germans, p. 39.
17. Although usually dismissed as poor in comparison to the composite bow, it should be noted that the English longbow of the Middle Ages was made from a single piece of wood, utilizing the differences in compression and flexibility between the heartwood and the outer layers.
18. Agathias, Hist., 2.5.4.
19. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 68.
20. For example, Proc. Vandals 3.8.15–28; Goths 5.27.1ff.
21. Isidore, Etymologiae, 18.6.9: http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/L/Roman/Texts/Isidore/18*.html#6 (June 2009).
22. Greg. Tur. securis e.g. 2.27, 8.30: bipennis e.g. 8.19, 10.27.
23. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 65.
24. Ibid., p. 108.
25. Bishop and Coulston, Roman Military Equipment, p. 200.
26. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 65.
27. Ibid., p. 67.
28. Defined by the Bosworth-Toller dictionary as a short-sword or dagger: http://beowulf.engl.uky.edu/~kiernan/BT/bosworth.htm, p.853 (June 2009).
29. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 65.
30. Ibid., p. 67.
31. Amm. Marc. 16.12.24. Unfortunately, the claim does not seem to be attested by the reference.
32. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 70.
33. Ibid., p. 69.
34. Ibid., p. 45.
35. Ibid., p. 74.
36. Amm. Marc. 16.12.21–2 and 37–42.
37. Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 81.
38. I would like once again to thank Chris Constantine of spitfirehorsebows.com for the illuminating discussions on the difference between the symmetrical and asymmetrical bow.
39. Ammianus, translated by Maenchen-Helfen, World of the Huns, pp. 201–202.
40. For example, Zos. 5.20: Agathias 1.22.
41. See Chapter 15.
42. Heather, The Goths, p. 98.
Chapter 6
1. For comparison, Jones, Later Roman Empire, p. 1434 estimates the strength of the Gallic army at 34,000.
2. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 333.
3. Ibid., p. 345ff.
4. Heinzelmann, in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 245.
5. The most obvious example of this is Hydatius, who made appeals in person to Aetius concerning conditions regarding the Sueves.
6. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 336 and n.1.
7. Ausonius, Ordo Urbium Nobilium 10.
8. MacMullen, Corruption and the Decline of Rome, p. 171; Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire: AD 284–641, pp. 351–354.
9. Mitchell, History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 355.
10. C
hron. Gall. 452, s.a 425; Prosp. s.a. 424.
11. For example, Elton, Warfare in Roman Europe, p. 42 notes that the Goths ‘quickly established a kingdom’: cf. Mitchell, S, A History of the Later Roman Empire, p. 110; Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars, p. 183.
12. See Hughes, Stilicho, p. 135ff. for a discussion of Alaric’s use of this title. For alternate uses of the title ‘rex’, see for example Gillett, On Barbarian Identity, p. 116ff.
13. Hughes, Stilicho, p. 135.
14. O’Flynn, Generalissimos, p. 73
15. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians, p. 53.
16. cf. Nixon in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, pp. 68–69.
17. Paul. Pella, 377f: Heather, 2002, 87-8.
18. Elton, 2004, 42-3.
19. Nixon in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 72.
20. Prosp. s.a. 425.
21. For example, Matthews, Western Aristocracies, p. 329; Heather in Drinkwater and Elton, Fifth Century Gaul, p. 85.
22. Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 335.
23. For an alternative view, see for example ibid., p. 329, who claims that the attack was due to the fact that the Goths were isolated, both with regards to communications and trade from the Mediterranean.
24. This course of events is based upon Sid. Ap. Carm. 7. 215–226, 481–483, 495–499. The Eparchius Avitus under consideration was Sidonius’ father-in-law and is attested as visiting his relative Theodorus, a hostage at the court of Theoderic. The most likely date for this is shortly after the conclusion of the war of 426.
25. PLRE Vol. 2 gives a date of either 425 or 426 (Aetius 7, 22). See also the discussion of the chronology of the chronicles in the introduction.
26. cf. Gall. Chron. 452, s.a. 425.
27. For further analysis of the chronicles, see the Introduction.
28. Prosp. s.a. 426.
29. Freeman, ‘Aetius and Boniface’, p. 436ff. claims that the problem, as illustrated by the letters of St Augustine, was that Boniface was no longer interested in fulfilling his duties and had lost control of large parts of Africa. Although a possibility, the details are outside the scope of a book on Aetius.
30. Proc. 3.3.14–22; John Ant. fr. 196; Theoph, AM 5931.
31. Prosp. s.a. 427. Oost, ‘Some Problems in the History of Galla Placidia’.
32. A view also supported by O’Flynn, Generalissimos, pp. 78–79.