Aetius Attila’s Nemesis Page 14

  Yet Gaiseric retained command of the majority of the Vandals and was still intent on capturing more territory in Spain. In 428 they captured, and this time held, Hispalis.50 They now had large parts of the south of Spain under their control.51

  The Vandals Cross to Africa

  Despite his successes in Spain, it was clear to Gaiseric that his people would always live in fear of a Roman and Suevic attack as long as they remained in Spain. Furthermore, following his acquisition of ships, there was now within his reach a Roman province that was untouched by war and of vital importance to the Romans. With the Roman fleets in use elsewhere, and so unable to stop him, in 429 Gaiseric gathered his people together and prepared to lead them in a wholesale migration across the Straits of Gibraltar to Tingitania.

  It is usually accepted that Gaiseric led the whole of the Vandals and Alans to Africa. However, it is possible that some of them had no desire to fight yet another long war with the Romans and instead wished to remain in Spain. These may have now separated from the main body of the Vandals under the leadership of an individual named Andevotus.52 It should be noted that Andevotus is otherwise unknown and may not have been associated with the Vandals, instead being an (Ostro)Goth.53

  With his heart set on a move to Africa, Gaiseric received disturbing news. Hermenegarius, described by Hydatius as ‘king of the Sueves’, although more likely either a son of Hermeric or an unrelated noble, was plundering Lusitania.54 Gaiseric did not have enough ships to ferry the Vandals to Africa in one crossing: it would take many journeys before they were all safe in Africa.

  Gaiseric realized that to attempt a crossing now would leave those Vandals still in Spain awaiting the return of ships vulnerable to attack by the Sueves. Gathering his forces, he led his army in pursuit of the Sueves, finally catching them at Emerita. Defeated in battle, Hermenegarius fled, drowning in the River Ana.55 Returning south, Gaiseric finally led his people across the Straits into Africa.

  There has been much debate concerning the dating of the crossing to Africa and regarding the claim by Procopius and Jordanes that Boniface invited the Vandals in return for aid against his Roman enemies.56 The dating of the crossing is insecure. However, on this occasion it is possible that Hydatius, living in Spain, is closer to the mark, especially as he may be referring to an unknown source when he dates the crossing specifically to May of 429.57 Furthermore, 429 allows time for all of the other events chronicled to happen without undue speed of action being required.58 Consequently, it will be assumed that it was in May 429 that the Vandals crossed to Africa from Spain.

  The claim that Boniface was responsible for inviting the Vandals into Africa is also extremely unlikely.59 Although in revolt against the government in Ravenna, he will have suspected that it was not Placidia herself that was responsible but Felix: Boniface’s loyalty had been rewarded in the past and his faithful service would expect continued loyalty from Placidia. Such an invitation would have been seen as the ultimate treachery in Ravenna. However, the strongest argument against Boniface inviting the Vandals into Africa is the complete silence of contemporaries, who in reality would have made the most violent complaints had this been true.60

  Furthermore, as an experienced commander, Boniface will also have known the perils associated with inviting such a large body of barbarian troops into a relatively undefended province, especially without military supervision. The scenes of his battles against Felix’s commanders in the province of Africa were a long way from the Vandals’ crossing point. Unsupervised, the Vandals would almost certainly begin to devastate the country around them in the hope of extorting large subsidies and land for their families. As a result of these deliberations, it is possible to theorize that both Procopius and Jordanes knew of Boniface’s employment of small numbers of Vandals in the civil war and so assumed that the price for their use was the invitation to cross into Africa.61 As a final point, at this time Boniface’s friends at court were by now enlisted to help clear him from the accusations that had started the war. It would be foolish of Boniface to risk his hope of clearing his name by inviting the Vandals into Africa.

  It has also been suggested that Aetius was responsible for the suggestion that the Vandals cross to Africa after the loss of the unnamed battle alongside the Sueves in Spain.62 This is extremely unlikely, as at this point he was not in a position either to travel to the south of Spain, being embroiled in events in Gaul and Ravenna, or to negotiate with the Vandals, since his office was that of magister militum per Gallias. In this context it should be noted that the concept of reaching Africa had proved a lure to the Gothic leader Alaric shortly before his death in 410, and his successor Wallia had also contemplated the crossing in 415:63 that Gaiseric should consider it with his newly acquired fleet is only natural.

  In May–June 429 Gaiseric used his available ships to transport his peoples across the Straits of Gibraltar. The only source for the number of people who crossed is Victor of Vita. He notes that, in an effort to cause fear in Africa, Geiseric ordered a count of his people, ‘even those who had come from the womb into the light that very day’.64 This produced a figure of 80,000 men, women and children. Procopius later noted the claim that there were 80,0000 Vandals in the crossing to Africa, but that the actual number was 50,000.65 This suggests a viable fighting force of no more than around 20,000 men. Although sometimes questioned by modern historians, it is interesting to observe that Victor himself notes that ‘news of this [number of 80,000] had spread widely’, and that he was informing people of the true nature of the crossing.66 It would appear that the rumour had spread that the Vandals had crossed with 80,000 fighting men.

  Landing in Mauretania Tingitana, Gaiseric might have expected to face the local army in battle, but since the comes Tingitana had a maximum of 5,000–7,000 men, of whom at the most 1,500 would have been capable of facing Gaiseric’s battle-hardened veterans, it is unsurprising that the local commander made no move to stop the overwhelming might of the Vandals.67 With the Vandals now at large south of the Mediterranean and with the important province of Africa under direct threat, Boniface’s position was looking extremely insecure.

  Chapter 7

  Magister Militum Praesentalis1

  FELIX, BONIFACE AND AETIUS

  Stilicho (who controlled the West between 395 and 408) had used the term comes et magister utriusque militum praesentalis and parens principum to denote his power in the West up to his death in 408.2 Following his lead, Constantius III had combined the titles comes et magister utriusque militum praesentalis and patricius (patrician) to demonstrate his position of dominance in the West.3

  In 425, after the defeat of John, Felix had probably been given the title of comes et magister utriusque militum praesentalis and patricius in emulation of Constantius III.4 In theory he was now in the same position as Stilicho and Constantius: effective ruler of the West. Yet this was not so, as, unlike Stilicho or Constantius, Felix had no known backing from the aristocracy of the West and had two challengers to his authority. The first was Boniface, who had supported Galla Placidia during her time of need, and the other was the latecomer Aetius.

  Due to Felix’s (successful) attempt to have Boniface disgraced, it is clear that early in Valentinian’s reign Felix understandably perceived Boniface as the greater threat. This is supported by the fact that during this early period it would actually have been easier for Felix to invent a claim that Aetius was planning on rebelling, since his loyalty to Valentinian would have been a cause for concern. That this was not attempted implies that Aetius was too weak politically and militarily – especially once the Huns had been sent home – to be seen as a threat, although it is possible that even at this early date he had a reputation for being a man of his word and so unlikely to rebel. Furthermore, unlike Aetius, Boniface had been appointed by Honorius and supported by Theodosius II. He had no reason to support Felix as a benefactor. It is likely that Felix would have liked to remove Boniface and replace him with one of his own supporters. Recent his
tory had shown that the commander in Africa wielded great power, as he could cut the supply of grain to Rome and Italy. Felix would not want this position occupied by a political opponent. Yet although the plan to disgrace Boniface had apparently succeeded, the situation was about to be turned on its head.

  The year 429 began with two very different reports. Aetius returned to Ravenna bringing news of victories in Gaul and what looked like the beginnings of a complete Roman recovery in the north west. On the other hand, the Vandals were ravaging the western Mediterranean and the war with Boniface looked like it would last indefinitely. However, at some point during the course of the war Placidia had decided that it was not in character for Boniface to attempt to establish his own empire, especially as his loyalty had previously been faultless. As a result, she sent some of Boniface’s friends to Africa to open talks with him.5 At this point the envoys were shown the evidence, and especially the letter telling Boniface not to return to Rome if so ordered.6 When she heard this Placidia ordered a halt to hostilities and under the guidance of a negotiator from Rome by the name of Darius, who was a senator, Sigisvult and Boniface concluded a peace treaty.7 Boniface was re-instated in favour at the court.8 With peace declared, either in late 429 or early in 430 Sigisvult returned to Italy, and Celer, an individual who had previously been vicarius of Africa, was appointed Proconsul of Africa.9

  This was none too soon, as it will have been in mid–late summer 429 that messengers arrived in Carthage with the news that the Vandals had crossed the Straits of Hercules and landed in Tingitania. After Sigisvult had returned to Ravenna, probably early in 430, Boniface began to martial his forces for a campaign against the Vandals. Furthermore, if in Italy they had not heard before, Sigisvult returned to Ravenna with the disastrous news that the Vandals were in Africa and heading towards Carthage. Alarmed at the news, messengers were sent from Ravenna to Constantinople telling of the Vandal invasion and asking for help.10 Darius headed west in an attempt to negotiate with the Vandals.11

  comes et magister utriusque militiae

  The fact that Felix had used his influence and power to disgrace Boniface, who up to that point had been Placidia’s loyal supporter, no doubt turned Placidia against Felix. Recognizing that Felix’s position as the only comes et magister utriusque militiae gave him almost unlimited power, Placidia decided to set up a rival to counterbalance his presence. This could not be Boniface: politically, appointing him as comes et magister utriusque militiae would be unacceptable, since it was clear that he and Felix were now enemies. Such a move would be interpreted – correctly – by Felix as specifically aimed at himself. Although his reaction would be unknown, it would almost certainly result in another civil war.

  However, appointing Aetius was a possibility. He was certainly in opposition to Felix. In fact, Felix may have recognized that Aetius was quickly becoming a threat, with his power-base in Gaul. As a result, Felix may have attempted to undermine Aetius’ popularity in Gaul by appointing a Gaul named Theodosius, who is otherwise unknown, as praefectus praetorio Italiae et Africae (Praetorian Prefect of Italy and Africa).12 Felix may have hoped that fostering clients in Gaul would help to counterbalance Aetius’ popularity there. On the other hand, it is possible that the appointment was made by Valentinian and Placidia and was simply an appointment by the new regime of an individual known to be loyal to Valentinian.

  Although the appointment of Theodosius has sometimes been interpreted as a part of Aetius’ political manoeuvring, this is almost certainly false. Theodosius was promoted to the post prior to February 430, when Aetius was still only magister militum per Gallias and so unable to make such high-level appointments.13 Even if Aetius had suggested the appointment, Felix would naturally have blocked such an obvious attempt by Aetius to curry favour in Gaul. The political attempt to undermine Aetius ensured that there would be no co-operation between him and Felix.

  The appointment of Aetius as magister militum praesentalis could be justified: his military achievements in Gaul had gone a long way to recovering Rome’s authority in the area. If his skills could be employed in larger areas of the West, it would help to secure Rome’s recovery. However, as magister militum per Gallias he did not have the authority to interfere in Spain and possibly at a later date Britain. For that he needed a post that allowed him to move freely between prefectures. As a result, on his return from Gaul Aetius was given the post of comes et magister utriusque militiae, although this would have been related to the junior post of magister equitum: Placidia was not strong enough to oust Felix, who retained the more senior post of magister peditum.14 It is possible that in her desire to raise Aetius to be magister militum praesentalis Placidia was trying to emulate the situation in the East. Since the time of Theodosius I there had been five nominally equal magistri.15 Unfortunately, this was against all of the traditions of the more conservative West, and any attempt to enforce such a reform would doubtless help to cement opposition to her plans. This was even more the case since she was not the ruling emperor.16 Although as magister peditum Felix still retained seniority, there can be little doubt that Aetius’ promotion was against his wishes. Placidia had decidedly raised the stakes by making Aetius a real rival to Felix, rather than just a potential one.17

  430*

  Aetius’ appointment could not come too soon. The west was still in dire straits with enemies both internal and external roaming at will. Probably his first task in the new year was to counter a large band of Visigoths led by an individual named Anaolsus who were wandering in Roman territory near to Arles. It is unknown whether this attack was ordered by Theoderic or was simply one of his nobles acting independently. If it was Anaolsus acting on his own initiative, then given the recent defeat at the hands of Aetius this was a dangerous move and liable to incur the displeasure of Theoderic, since it could easily be interpreted in Ravenna as Theoderic re-opening the earlier conflict. It is more likely that Theoderic had instigated this manoeuvre in order to test the strength and readiness of the empire: by the campaign season of 430 the news that the Vandals had invaded Africa had doubtless spread across the western Mediterranean. By employing Anaolsus, if the campaign went badly Theoderic could claim that Anaolsus was acting unilaterally and so avoid further conflict. If it went well, Theoderic could expand the attack using ‘royal’ forces. In the event, Theoderic did the right thing in distancing himself from Anaolsus’ attack. Leading the Gallic army, Aetius attacked Anaolsus and annihilated his forces, Anaolsus himself being captured.18

  Map 6. Aetius’ Campaigns in Gaul, Raetia and Italy

  Shortly after defeating Anaolsus Aetius turned the army around and headed back east, where he defeated a force of Iuthungi (Alamanni) in Raetia.19 It would appear that it was during this campaign that Flavius Merobaudes served under Aetius, according to an inscription on the base of a statue to Merobaudes in Trajan’s forum.20 The two victories ensured that Aetius’ reputation as a general continued to grow.

  The speed of the two victories demonstrates one outstanding aspect of Aetius’ generalship. In an era where manoeuvre and blockade were the order of the day, Aetius relied on the more direct tactics of either ambush or direct battle. The reason for this is simple. He had, in effect, been trained by the Huns and not by the Romans. The Huns’ use of ambush and direct force is mirrored in Aetius’ tactics throughout his career.

  It may have been during his time in Raetia that Aetius heard the sad news that Octar, king of the Huns, had died.21 He had been leading a raid on the Burgundians – probably those settled in Gaul in 413 – and had been killed in battle.22 This left Rua as the single leader of the Huns north of the Danube. Aetius had lost one of his most loyal supporters. Undeterred, he returned to the court at Ravenna, where the political stakes were to be raised in dramatic fashion.

  The Fall of Felix

  As is usual in these cases, the sources give only brief outlines and place different emphases upon the course of events. What follows is an attempt to analyze one of the major political
events of Aetius’ career, based upon two divergent sources, Prosper and Hydatius. In order to understand the problems faced at this juncture, it is useful to look at both. Prosper states that: ‘Aetius killed Felix and his wife Padusia and the deacon Grunitus, sensing that they were plotting against him.’23 On the other hand, Hydatius claims that: ‘Felix, who was called Patrician, was killed at Ravenna by a mutiny of the troops.’24

  At first glance it would appear that the two sources are contradictory and give alternative views of events. However, Prosper does not state how Felix was killed, and Hydatius does not give a reason for the ‘mutiny’. Close analysis allows for the two to be seen as complementary, one giving the reason for Felix’s death, the other the manner in which it was carried out. Although uncertainty must remain, what follows is a rational description of the events surrounding Felix’s death.

  Returning with the troops to Ravenna, Aetius discovered that Felix was present with his wife Padusia. Also with them was the deacon Grunitus. Aetius now claimed that Felix was plotting against him, just as he had plotted against Boniface, and was planning to have him killed. Whether the claim was made on Aetius’ initiative is unknown. The troops appear to have been more loyal to Aetius, a Western general who was actively defeating the enemies of the West, rather than Felix, an eastern interloper who does not appear to have strayed far from court.25 The troops duly decided that their loyalty to Aetius was paramount and rebelled – mutinied – against Felix. They attacked and killed him and his party, including Padusia and Grunitus.